scholarly journals Private Contracting, Law and Finance

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graeme Acheson ◽  
Gareth Campbell ◽  
John D. Turner
2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (11) ◽  
pp. 4156-4195 ◽  
Author(s):  
Graeme G Acheson ◽  
Gareth Campbell ◽  
John D Turner

Abstract In the late nineteenth century Britain had almost no mandatory shareholder protections, but had very developed financial markets. We argue that private contracting between shareholders and corporations meant that the absence of statutory protections was immaterial. Using approximately 500 articles of association from before 1900, we code the protections offered to shareholders in these private contracts. We find that firms voluntarily offered shareholders many of the protections that were subsequently included in statutory corporate law. We also find that companies offering better protection to shareholders had less concentrated ownership. Received August 19, 2016; editorial decision October 24, 2018 by Editor David Denis. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Coyle ◽  
Aldo Musacchio ◽  
John D. Turner
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathias M Siems ◽  
Amedeo De Cesari

Author(s):  
Ronald J. Gilson

In the 1960s and 1970s, corporate law and finance scholars gave up on their traditional approaches. Corporate law had become “towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but wind.” In finance, the theory of the firm was recognized as an “empty box.” This essay tracks how corporate law was reborn as corporate governance through three examples of how we have usefully complicated the inquiry into corporate behavior. Part I frames the first complication, defining governance broadly as the company’s operating system, a braided framework of legal and non-legal elements. Part II adds a second complication by making the inquiry dynamic: corporate governance as a path dependent process that co-evolves with the elements of the broader capitalist regime. Part III considers unsuccessful efforts to simplify rather than complicate corporate governance analysis through static single factor models: stakeholder, team production, director primacy, and shareholder primacy. Part IV concludes by highlighting the tradeoff between a governance system’s capacity to adapt to change and its ability to support long-term investment.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pier Giuseppe Monateri

Drawing on historical, normative, theoretical, and economic methodologies, Pier Giuseppe Monateri offers a fresh critical analysis of various dimensions of comparative law methods. Comprehensive and engaging with a multidisciplinary approach, this Advanced Introduction spans the fields of comparative legal studies, law and finance and global law.


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