לא רק לחקיקה יש תכלית: על מתן מעמד נורמטיבי ליוזמות חקיקה ועל דיאלוג לאורו של בג"ץ 781/15 ארד-פנקס נ' הועדה לאישור הסכמים לנשיאת עוברים על פי חוק הסכמים לנשיאת עוברים (אישור הסכם ומעמד הילוד), התשנ"ו-1996 The Legislation is not the only One with a Purpose: On Normative Status of Legislative initiatives and Dialogue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bell Yosef
Keyword(s):  
Normative Status

Connecting Gospels

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Second Century ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Field Of Study ◽  
Early Christian ◽  
Single Field ◽  
Vantage Points ◽  
Canonical Texts ◽  
Normative Status ◽  
Two Bodies ◽  
Shed Light

By the late second century, early Christian gospels had been divided into two groups by a canonical boundary that assigned normative status to four of them while consigning their competitors to the margins. The project of this volume is to find ways to reconnect these divided texts. The primary aim is not to address the question whether the canonical/non-canonical distinction reflects substantive and objectively verifiable differences between the two bodies of texts—although that issue may arise at various points. Starting from the assumption that, in spite of their differences, all early gospels express a common belief in the absolute significance of Jesus and his earthly career, the intention is to make their interconnectedness fruitful for interpretation. The approach taken is thematic and comparative: a selected theme or topic is traced across two or more gospels on either side of the canonical boundary, and the resulting convergences and divergences shed light not least on the canonical texts themselves as they are read from new and unfamiliar vantage points. The outcome is to demonstrate that early gospel literature can be regarded as a single field of study, in contrast to the overwhelming predominance of the canonical four characteristic of traditional gospels scholarship.

scholarly journals The Problem of Unwelcome Epistemic Company

Episteme ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Joshua Blanchard
Keyword(s):  
Peer Disagreement ◽  
Normative Status

Abstract Many of us are unmoved when it is objected that some morally or intellectually suspect source agrees with our belief. While we may tend to find this kind of guilt by epistemic association unproblematic, I argue that this tendency is a mistake. We sometimes face what I call the problem of unwelcome epistemic company. This is the problem of encountering agreement about the content of your belief from a source whose faults give you reason to worry about the belief's truth, normative status, etiology, or implications. On the basis of an array of cases, I elaborate four distinct kinds of problems that unwelcome epistemic company poses. Two of these are distinctly epistemic, and two are moral. I canvass possible responses, ranging from stubbornness to an epistemic prudishness that avoids unwelcome company at all costs. Finally, I offer preliminary lessons of the problem and distinguish it from the problem of peer disagreement.

scholarly journals The all-too-flexible abductive method: ATOM's normative status

2008 ◽  
Vol 64 (9) ◽  
pp. 1023-1036 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem Romeijn
Keyword(s):  
Normative Status

Slangs as a Special Group of Words

2020 ◽  
Vol 60 (11) ◽  
pp. 103-107
Author(s):  
Mehriban Zeynal Hajizade ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Key Words ◽  
Native Speakers ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Main Function ◽  
Special Group ◽  
Modern Times ◽  
The World ◽  
Normative Status ◽  
Over Time

In modern times, the processes in the world have affected the field of linguistics as well as all other fields.These processes require a diffferent approach to issues related to the use of specific word groups. Over time, language develops and changes occur at all levels. Taking into consideration that the main function of language is a means of communication between people, all changes should be taken into account to make the function more convenient and more suitable. Some of the processes that take place in the language are directly related to the speech process, and ends with getting the gradual normative status of variants in the speech of native speakers. Native speakers use some expressions that gained and didn’t gain status of norms in their speech. They use specific word groups to make their speech more specific and expressive. These word groups are used by some groups of people for special goals. Slangs are new meaningful words used in different social groups. Slangs are presented as non-literary concept. Slangs are various and colorful according to their tones. Key words: slang, morphem, term, communication, society

scholarly journals Memory and reflection

2021 ◽  
Vol 44 (spe2) ◽  
pp. 151-168
Author(s):  
Chienkuo Mi
Keyword(s):  
Problem Solving ◽  
Virtue Epistemology ◽  
Animal Cognition ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Careful Examination ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Past ◽  
The Analects ◽  
Normative Status ◽  
Previous Learning

Abstract: I have argued that the Analects of Confucius presents us with a conception of reflection with two components, a retrospective component and a perspective component. The former component involves hindsight or careful examination of the past and as such draws on previous learning or memory and previously formed beliefs to avoid error. The latter component is foresight, or forward looking, and as such looks to existing beliefs and factors in order to achieve knowledge. In this paper, I raise the problem of forgetting and argue that most of contemporary theories of knowledge have to face the problem and deal with the challenge seriously. In order to solve the problem, I suggest a bi-level virtue epistemology which can provide us with the best outlook for the problem-solving. I will correlate two different cognitive capacities or processes of “memory” (and “forgetting”) with the conception of reflection, and evaluate them under two different frameworks, a strict deontic framework (one that presupposes free and intentional determination) and a more loosely deontic framework (one that highlights functional and mechanical faculties). The purpose is to show that reflection as meta-cognition plays an important and active role and enjoys a better epistemic (normative) status in our human endeavors (cognitive or epistemic) than those of first-order (or animal) cognition, such as memory, can play.

NO TEARS FOR CREON

Legal Theory ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 245-266
Author(s):  
Marc O. DeGirolami
Keyword(s):  
Religious Liberty ◽  
The Other ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Free Exercise ◽  
Comprehensive Theory ◽  
Liberty Of Conscience ◽  
Equal Respect ◽  
The Government ◽  
Normative Status

This essay critiques Professor Martha Nussbaum's book, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America's Tradition of Religious Equality (2008). Nussbaum's thesis is that the entire tradition of religious liberty in America can be both best understood (as a historical exercise) and justified (as a philosophical one) by recourse to the overarching principle of equal respect—that “[a]ll citizens have equal rights and deserve equal respect from the government under which they live.” Nussbaum insists that equal respect pervades the tradition and that all other values of religious liberty are subordinate to it. She examines various free-exercise and establishment issues in light of this principle, concluding that the tradition of religious equality is under threat and calling for renewed vigilance in its defense. This essay criticizes Nussbaum's elevation of the principle of equal respect to supreme normative status. It claims that Nussbaum's single-minded focus on equal respect distorts and misunderstands the conflicts actually at issue in many religious liberty disputes. The essay focuses specifically on the inadequacies of her assessment of two prominent religious liberty cases, one in the free exercise and the other in the established context. This essay concludes that there are reasons for deep skepticism about Nussbaum's approach as a comprehensive theory of the religion clauses.

Toward a broader understanding of social talk in Web-based courses

2012 ◽  
Vol 32 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Linda Reneland-Forsman
Keyword(s):  
Computer Mediated Communication ◽  
School Teachers ◽  
Mediated Communication ◽  
Group Culture ◽  
Web Based ◽  
Web Based Learning ◽  
Computer Mediated ◽  
Mediated Discourse ◽  
Narrative Format ◽  
Normative Status

AbstractThe interactive potential of computer-mediated communication has proved more difficult to realize than expected. This study tries to break away from the normative status of speech underlining computer-mediated communication by asking how social talk is manifested in Web-based learning environments. The asynchronous communication of 55 students during a study period of 18 weeks was examined using mediated discourse analysis. The students were training as pre-school teachers in a four-year program. Their ability to create a group culture seemed significant for how they developed group autonomy and were able to handle unexpected incidents or a loose framing. The communication between the students was in narrative format and was lengthy in character; trust and confidence were dropped off as part of a constant construction of group culture. These students did not adopt or develop known means of compensating for the loss of nonverbal clues. There were indications of sharing private concerns and information from other practices in life as a conditional aspect of participation. When having troubles to cope, it was the youngest students who failed.

The Normativity of Meaning Revisited

2019 ◽  
pp. 295-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans-Johann Glock
Keyword(s):  
Final Section ◽  
Human Communication ◽  
Evolution Of Language ◽  
Different Dimensions ◽  
Correct Application ◽  
Linguistic Behaviour ◽  
Normativity Of Meaning ◽  
Semantic Normativity ◽  
And Linguistics ◽  
Normative Status

The question of whether meaning is inherently normative has become a central topic in philosophy and linguistics. It also has crucial implications for anthropology and for understanding the evolution of language. This chapter defends the normativity of meaning against some recent challenges. Anti-normativists contend that while there are “semantic principles”—aka explanations of meaning—specifying conditions for the correct application of expressions, these are either not genuinely normative or they are not in fact constitutive of meaning. This dilemma can be defused if one clarifies the notions of norm, rule, and convention, distinguishes different dimensions of semantic normativity, and pays attention to different types of mistakes that can afflict linguistic behaviour. One needs to keep apart: norms of truth and of meaning, regulative and constitutive rules, rules and the reasons for following or disregarding them, pro tanto and all things considered obligations. On that basis the chapter argues that correctness is a normative notion and that constitutive rules in general and explanations of meaning in particular play various normative roles in linguistic practices. Furthermore, while speakers may conform to and occasionally violate semantic principle for defeasible prudential reasons, this is perfectly compatible with the principles having a normative status. The final section discusses the question of whether human communication requires communally shared rules or conventions and the age-old problem of circularity: how could such conventions be essential to language, given that the latter appears prerequisite for establishing and communicating conventions in the first place?

Folk Jurisprudence and Neurointervention

2020 ◽  
pp. 191-230
Author(s):  
Thomas Nadelhoffer ◽  
Daniela Goya-Tocchetto ◽  
Jennifer Cole Wright ◽  
Quinn McGuire
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
General Population ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Underlying Assumption ◽  
Theory To Practice ◽  
Feasibility Constraints ◽  
Prison Populations ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Folk Intuitions ◽  
Normative Status

Our chapter is motivated by an underlying assumption that layperson’s intuitions, beliefs, and judgments about moral and legal issues and public policy—which we refer to as “folk jurisprudence”—is relevant to philosophical and legal theorizing about the normative status of the use of neurological interventions. While we are quick to acknowledge that researchers need not be entirely beholden to the dictates of folk jurisprudence, we nevertheless believe that layperson’s attitudes about the relationship between neuroscience and the law ought to at least serve as feasibility constraints when it comes to the important project of getting from theory to practice. Given our beliefs concerning the relevance of folk intuitions to philosophical theorizing and public policy, we set out to explore these intuitions in a systematic way. So, we present the findings from three studies we ran which investigated people’s intuitions about the following practices and policies: (a) using interventions to reduce implicit bias in judges and jurors, (b) using interventions to reduce violence impulsivity on violent offenders, and (c) using interventions to improve moral behavior not only in prison populations but also in the general population. Having presented our findings, we then discuss what we take to be the relevance of this type of research to philosophy, law, and public policy.

What Would a Phenomenology of Logic Look Like?

Mind ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 129 (516) ◽  
pp. 1009-1031
Author(s):  
James Kinkaid
Keyword(s):  
Logical Consequence ◽  
Philosophy Of Logic ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
Consequence Relations ◽  
Consequence Relation ◽  
If Logic ◽  
Pure Logic ◽  
Logical Investigations ◽  
Normative Status ◽  
Selection Of

Abstract The phenomenological movement begins in the Prolegomena to Husserl’s Logical Investigations as a philosophy of logic. Despite this, remarkably little attention has been paid to Husserl’s arguments in the Prolegomena in the contemporary philosophy of logic. In particular, the literature spawned by Gilbert Harman’s work on the normative status of logic is almost silent on Husserl’s contribution to this topic. I begin by raising a worry for Husserl’s conception of ‘pure logic’ similar to Harman’s challenge to explain the connection between logic and reasoning. If logic is the study of the forms of all possible theories, it will include the study of many logical consequence relations; by what criteria, then, should we select one (or a distinguished few) consequence relation(s) as correct? I consider how Husserl might respond to this worry by looking to his late account of the ‘genealogy of logic’ in connection with Gurwitsch’s claim that ‘[i]t is to prepredicative perceptual experience … that one must return for a radical clarification and for the definitive justification of logic’. Drawing also on Sartre and Heidegger, I consider how prepredicative experience might constrain or guide our selection of a logical consequence relation and our understanding of connectives like implication and negation.

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