Robust Monetary Policy under Discretion in a New Keynesian Model with Incomplete Interest Rate Pass-Through

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kohei Hasui ◽  
Daisuke Ida ◽  
Mitsuhiro Okano
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Pass Through

scholarly journals ROBUST MONETARY POLICY IN A NEW KEYNESIAN MODEL WITH IMPERFECT INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH

2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1504-1526 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafael Gerke ◽  
Felix Hammermann
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Model Misspecification ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy ◽  
Loan Rate ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Pass Through ◽  
Policy Shifts

We use robust control to study how a central bank in an economy with imperfect interest rate pass-through conducts monetary policy if it fears that its model could be misspecified. We find that, first, whether robust optimal monetary policy under commitment responds more cautiously or more aggressively depends crucially on the source of shock. Imperfect pass-through amplifies the robust policy. Second, if the central bank is concerned about uncertainty, it dampens volatility in the inflation rate preemptively but accepts higher volatility in the output gap and loan rate. However, for highly sticky loan rates, insurance against model misspecification becomes particularly pricy. Third, if the central bank fears uncertainty only in the IS equation or the loan rate equation, the robust policy shifts its concern for stabilization away from inflation.

scholarly journals The Four Equation New Keynesian Model

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Eric Sims ◽  
Jing Cynthia Wu ◽  
Ji Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Natural Rate ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Bond Portfolio ◽  
Linearized Model ◽  
Credit Shocks

Abstract This paper develops a New Keynesian model featuring financial intermediation, short- and long-term bonds, credit shocks, and scope for unconventional monetary policy. The log-linearized model reduces to four equations – Phillips and IS curves as well as policy rules for the short-term interest rate and the central bank's long-bond portfolio (QE). Credit shocks and QE appear in both the IS and Phillips curves. In equilibrium, optimal monetary policy entails adjusting the short-term interest rate to offset natural rate shocks, but using QE to offset credit market disruptions. Use of QE significantly mitigates the costs of a binding zero lower bound.

scholarly journals LOAN PRODUCTION AND MONETARY POLICY

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-143
Author(s):  
Miguel Casares ◽  
Luca Deidda ◽  
Jose E. Galdon-Sanchez
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Interest Rate ◽  
Business Cycle ◽  
Financial Frictions ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Optimal Monetary Policy ◽  
External Finance ◽  
Business Cycle Fluctuations ◽  
Keynesian Model

We examine optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with unemployment and financial frictions where banks produce loans using equity as collateral. Firms and households demand loans to finance externally a fraction of their flows of expenditures. Our findings show amplifying business-cycle effects of a more rigid loan production technology. In the monetary policy analysis, the optimal rule clearly outperforms a Taylor-type rule. The optimized interest-rate response to the external finance premium turns significantly negative when either banking rigidities are high or when financial shocks are the only source of business cycle fluctuations.

ARE MAJOR CENTRAL BANKS BLINDED BY THE ANALYTICAL ELEGANCE OF THEIR MODELS? POSSIBLE COSTS OF UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY MEASURES

2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (01) ◽  
pp. 87-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
PIOTR CIŻKOWICZ ◽  
ANDRZEJ RZOŃCAZ
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Significant Risk ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Unconventional Monetary Policy ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
Policy Measures ◽  
The Global Financial Crisis

We survey the possible costs of the unconventional monetary policy measures undertaken by major central banks after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. We argue that these costs are not easily discernable in the new Keynesian (NK) model, which defines a theoretical framework for monetary policy. First, the costs may result from the effects of unconventional monetary policy measures on the intensity of restructuring and the persistence of uncertainty (which increased after the outbreak of the crisis). However, neither of these processes is considered in the new Keynesian model. Second, costs may be generated not only by distortions in the choices made by economic agents but may also be a result of the decisions made by governments, particularly in terms of the fiscal deficit level. However, the new Keynesian model does not consider the effects of unconventional monetary policy measures on the quality of fiscal policy. Without carefully considering the costs, there is a significant risk that unconventional monetary policy measures could become a conventional response to recurrent crises.

Generalizing the Taylor Principle: Reply

2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (1) ◽  
pp. 618-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
Troy Davig ◽  
Eric M Leeper
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Regime Switching ◽  
Multiple Solutions ◽  
New Keynesian ◽  
New Keynesian Model ◽  
Keynesian Model ◽  
The One

Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) (FWZ) show that a new Keynesian model with regime-switching monetary policy can support multiple solutions, appearing to contradict findings in Davig and Leeper (2007) (DL). The explanation is straightforward: FWZ derive solutions using a model that differs from the one to which the DL conditions apply. The FWZ solutions also require that the exogenous driving process is a function of private and policy parameters. This undermines the sharp distinctions among “deep parameters” typical of optimizing models and makes it difficult to ascribe economic interpretations to FWZ's additional solutions. (E12, E31, E43, E52)

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