Product Differentiation, Market Power and Resource Allocation

Author(s):  
Bruno Pellegrino
2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Sean Morris

This Article defines the notion of market power and how in conjunction with trademark rights give rise to elements that are deemed anticompetitive in a free market society. This Article uses legal arguments to consider how important developments in antitrust economics, particularly product differentiation and monopolistic competition, have contributed to the notion that trademarks are a source of market power. The Article uses a number of cases in the field of trademarks to underscore the key points that trademarks are a source of market power. These case developments contribute to the monopolistic tendencies of trademarks and describe how such tendencies are associated with the theory on market power and product differentiation. Empirically, the Article examines beer products from a single large corporation and the various trademarks/brands to determine whether such brands are a source of market power, effectively giving that manufacturer a monopoly on the beer market. A discussion of product hopping in pharmaceuticals is used to supplement the theories and evidence from the beer market. The Article also develops a theory of branded monopoly and suggests that, as a result of single ownership of trademarks and brands that are abundant from a single owner trademark’s market power, questions relating to antitrust foreclosure are often raised, despite the fact that market power is not anticompetitive per se. If it is recognized that trademarks are a source of market power, and hence, a core concern for antitrust law and policy, then the legal foundations of the current trademark system would need a radical redesign. If, on the other hand, it is recognized that trademarks are a source of market power, but do not conflict with antitrust law, and antitrust enforcers are to ignore conducts such as market foreclosure and other barriers to entry as a result of excessive trademarks and brands, then both antitrust and trademark law can continue to co-exist in the current system. 


2004 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
James I. Rude ◽  
Karl D. Meilke

The opportunities and challenges of incorporating accurate policy representations into institutional partial equilibrium commodity models were investigated. Six issues are raised: commodity space definition, vertical linkages, assessing market power, the changing nature of government support, trade policy, and data requirements. The importance of product attributes and different approaches to modeling product differentiation are considered. A case study of food safety is used to bring together the major issues. Although institutional commodity models still have a role to play, we advocate the use of smaller idiosyncratic models to address many of the relevant policy questions in a rapidly changing sector.


1992 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 90-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
George R. Milne

Product differentiation is a reality in today's consumer markets and warrants further study in antitrust analysis because product differentiation increases market power. Currently the FTC and Department of Justice rely on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to detect market power. However, the HHI is not sensitive to product market differentiation. The author uses marketing tools of market structure analysis to propose a new measure of concentration, the market concentration index (MCI), that reflects product market differentiation. The rationale for the new measure is based on marketing theory, antitrust court opinion, and the antitrust economics literature. MCI is compared with HHI and is shown to have several practical and theoretical advantages. The 1986 proposed mergers in the carbonated soda market are analyzed by means of both measures. The empirical work demonstrates MCI's ability for detecting changes in product market differentiation.


2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Βασιλική Μπαγέρη

Economists have been involved a lot in recent years in considering issues of enforcement of Competition law and how enforcement can become more effective, such as legal standards, substantive standards, penalties etc. This dissertation, contributes to the above by examining two important dimensions of the enforcement of Competition law: (i) fines and (ii) the requirement of extant market power in forming a presumption that unilateral firm actions or mergers may lead to social harm. Particularly, we study some key issues concerning the calculation of optimal fines by Competition and Regulatory Authorities (Chapter 2), we introduce a new methodology for setting fines (Chapter 3) and we examine the effects of exclusion in abuse of dominance cases with product differentiation and how they depend on the source of market power (Chapter 4). At the end of each chapter we give the conclusions relating to each of the main essays.


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