Sibling Rivalry: Zero-Sum Dynamics of Managerial Power and Resource Allocation in Business Groups

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Keum
2008 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 597-608 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliane Gonçalves Gomes ◽  
João Carlos Correia Baptista Soares de Mello ◽  
Lidia Angulo Meza

Resource allocation is one of the traditional Operations Research problems. In this paper we propose a hybrid model for resource allocation that uses Data Envelopment Analysis efficiency measures. We use Zero Sum Gains DEA models as the starting point to decrease the computational work for the step-bystep algorithm to allocate integer resources in a DEA context. Our approach is illustrated by a numerical example.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-112
Author(s):  
H.Vincent Poor ◽  
Narayan B. Mandayam ◽  
Wade Trappe ◽  
Andrey Garnaev

In this paper, we consider a communication connectivity problem involving a primary user (transmitter, for example, a Ground Control Station (GCS)) servicing a group of secondary users (receivers, for example, drones) under hostile interference. We formulate this multi-link communication connectivity problem, where the channels are affected by Rayleigh fading, as a zero-sum power resource allocation game between a transmitter and an adversary (jammer). The transmitter's objective is to maximize the probability of communication connectivity with all the receivers. It is proven that the problem has unique equilibrium in power allocation strategies, and the equilibrium is derived in closed form. Moreover, we reduce the problem of designing the equilibrium in power resource allocation strategies to the problem of finding a fixed point of a real-valued function. An algorithm based on the bisection method to find the fixed point (and so equilibrium strategies) is developed, and its convergence is proven.


1983 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 693-718 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Boreham

This paper is a critique of the tradition of sociological writing which has emphasized the ability of occupations organized on the professional principle to gain for their members an occupational monopoly and a position in the division of labour which provides them with autonomy to determine occupational tasks and functions. It is argued that theories which seek to account for the conditions which provide the framework for successful resistance to rationalization and codification in professional work have not adequately articulated the concept of power. The theoretical discourse on professional and managerial power has therefore tended, with few exceptions, to locate the determination and exercise of power as though it were a zero sum commodity deriving from social relations of organizations. Theories predicting the emergence of professional rather than mangerial forms of control therefore have little explanatory ability other man for a particular mode of rationality within a limiting theoretical framework. This analysis represents an attempt to propose a mediation between structuralist theories of power and organization and those theoretical reflections on the professions which locate the determination of occupational authority in a broader matrix of social processes.


2015 ◽  
Vol 76 (11) ◽  
pp. 2045-2055
Author(s):  
V. V. Morozov ◽  
K. D. Shalbuzov
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
pp. 100808 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcella Bernardo ◽  
Matheus Alves Madeira de Souza ◽  
Ramon Sávio Moreira Lopes ◽  
Lásara Fabrícia Rodrigues

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Malhotra

AbstractAlthough Boyer & Petersen's (B&P's) cataloguing of and evolutionary explanations for folk-economic beliefs is important and valuable, the authors fail to connect their theories to existing explanations for why people do not think like economists. For instance, people often have moral intuitions akin to principles of fairness and justice that conflict with utilitarian approaches to resource allocation.


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