Banking Panics and the Lender of Last Resort in a Monetary Economy

SSRN Electronic Journal ◽

10.2139/ssrn.3338805 ◽

2019 ◽

Author(s):

Tarishi Matsuoka ◽

Makoto Watanabe

Keyword(s):

Lender Of Last Resort ◽

Monetary Economy ◽

Banking Panics

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The Federal Reserve and Panic Prevention: The Roles of Financial Regulation and Lender of Last Resort

The Journal of Economic Perspectives ◽

10.1257/jep.27.4.45 ◽

2013 ◽

Vol 27 (4) ◽

pp. 45-64 ◽

Cited By ~ 22

Author(s):

Gary Gorton ◽

Andrew Metrick

Keyword(s):

Federal Reserve ◽

Financial Regulation ◽

Institutional Design ◽

Regulatory System ◽

Lender Of Last Resort ◽

The Great Depression ◽

Board Of Governors ◽

Discount Window ◽

Banking Panics ◽

Panic Prevention

This paper surveys the role of the Federal Reserve within the financial regulatory system, with particular attention to the interaction of the Fed's role as both a supervisor and a lender-of-last-resort. The institutional design of the Federal Reserve System was aimed at preventing banking panics, primarily due to the permanent presence of the discount window. This new system was successful at preventing a panic in the early 1920s, after which the Fed began to discourage the use of the discount window and intentionally create “stigma” for window borrowing—policies that contributed to the panics of the Great Depression. The legislation of the New Deal era centralized Fed power in the Board of Governors, and over the next 75 years the Fed expanded its role as a supervisor of the largest banks. Nevertheless, prior to the recent crisis the Fed had large gaps in its authority as a supervisor and as lender of last resort, with the latter role weakened further by stigma. The Fed was unable to prevent the recent crisis, during which its lender of last resort function expanded significantly. As the Fed begins its second century, there are still great challenges to fulfilling its original intention of panic prevention.

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