The Impact of Tax Rates on Corporate Risk-Taking

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Markus Gamm
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-294
Author(s):  
Poonyawat Sreesing

PurposeThis study aims to examine how corporate taxes affect corporate risk-taking decisions.Design/methodology/approachThis study examines corporate risk-taking by analyzing how a firm’s asset risk changes following an acquisition carried out by publicly listed companies in the G7 nations. To measure the asset risk of a firm, this study uses the option pricing framework in Merton (1974).FindingsConsistent with an implication of the Merton (1974) framework, the findings show that firms take more risk in their investment decisions when tax rates are high. Moreover, the tax effects wane for firms with a relatively large borrowing opportunity and this suggests that the risk-taking incentive from taxes is moderated by the reputation concern in the debt market, lending support to the Diamond (1989) reputation-building model. The empirical results also show that the tax-induced risk-taking incentive is restrained by creditor rights. Overall, the study reveals an important role of taxes in the structure of corporate investment decisions.Practical implicationsThe implications of this study can be beneficial to policymakers when considering the alteration of tax rates, as it will affect the riskiness of firm investment decisions.Originality/valueThis study provides a better understanding of the role of taxes on risk-taking and also contributes to the growing body of evidence supporting tax effects of risk-taking. The relationship between taxes and risk-taking has proven that the corporate taxation is one of the key factors that firms consider during their selection of risky investments. Unlike previous studies, this research is the first to investigate the change in asset risk, estimating by the option pricing framework, through studying a particular event: mergers and acquisitions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 2-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zahid Irhsad Younas ◽  
Ameena Zafar

PurposeThis study aims to analyze the impact of corporate risk taking on the sustainability of firms in USA and Germany. As risk taking is an expensive phenomenon, the firm may shift the resources from stakeholder well-being to profit maximization of shareholders. Ultimately, risk taking results in the reduction of firm’s sustainability.Design/methodology/approachTo capture the impact of corporate risk taking, the corporate-governance variables, i.e. “independent board structure” and “board size,” were used as instrumental variables to control excessive corporate risk taking and restrict it at a healthy level. A sample of 3,387 unbalanced panel observations from USA and Germany, for the period 2004-2015, were assessed.FindingsThe results confirm that corporate risk taking has a negative and significant impact on the sustainability of firms.Research limitations/implicationsGovernment and policymakers in USA and Germany may introduce regulations to curb excessive corporate risk taking for sustainable corporations and sustainable society. This research suggests that corporate risk taking is not in the best interest of stakeholders.Originality/valuePrevious literature only finds the impact of sustainability on corporate risk taking and there is not a single study that examines the impact of corporate risk taking on the sustainability of a firm. Thus, this study contributes to existing literature on corporate risk taking and sustainability. The study further contributes by using the instrumental variable two stage least square.


2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher S. Armstrong ◽  
Stephen Glaeser ◽  
Sterling Huang ◽  
Daniel J. Taylor

ABSTRACT We examine the relation between managers' personal income tax rates and their corporate investment decisions. Using plausibly exogenous variation in federal and state tax rates, we find a positive relation between managers' personal tax rates and their corporate risk-taking. Moreover—and consistent with our theoretical predictions—we find that this relation is stronger among firms with investment opportunities that have a relatively high rate of return per unit of risk, and stronger among CEOs who have a relatively low marginal disutility of risk. Importantly, our results are unique to senior managers' tax rates––we do not find similar relations for middle-income tax rates. Collectively, our findings provide evidence that managers' personal income taxes influence their corporate risk-taking decisions. JEL Classifications: G30; G32; G38; H24; H32. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. Data on manager tax rates used in this paper are available at: http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/∼dtayl/.


2013 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 210-225
Author(s):  
Mohamed Sherif ◽  
Mahmoud Elsayed

Using a two-way panel regression analysis with fixed and random effects and the generalized method of moment(GMM), we investigate the impact of both firm-specific and external factors on the risk taking of Egyptian insurance companies. We use hand-collected data of Egyptian insurance companies over the period from 2006 to 2011 to estimate the relationship between total and systematic risks as risk measures and the independent variables. Following Eling and Mark (2011) the extent of risk taking is quantified through variations in stock prices and these are explained by firm-specific and external factors. We find that differences in company size, interest rate level and economic development affect variations in stock prices. The analysis also highlights differences between the life and non-life insurers, with the non-life insurers exhibiting a higher level of risk (market and premium) and board independence. The pattern of results are qualitatively the same for non-life insurers but different for life insurers when we use GMM method.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clara Xiaoling Chen ◽  
Minjeong (MJ) Kim ◽  
Laura Yue Li ◽  
Wei Zhu

This study provides the first large-sample archival evidence on the impact of three commonly used accounting performance goals (thresholds, targets, and maximums) in CEO compensation contracts on corporate risk taking. Using proxy statement disclosure on performance goals for CEOs of U.S. public companies, we find that lower thresholds and higher maximums are associated with greater corporate risk taking, and these results are more pronounced when CEOs have greater incentives to achieve accounting performance goals or have lower innate risk aversion. In addition, we find that target difficulty is not significantly associated with corporate risk taking after controlling for thresholds and maximums. Finally, we find that CEO compensation contracts are more likely to have lower thresholds and higher maximums when risk taking is more value-enhancing or when R&D investment is more profitable, consistent with boards setting performance goals to induce an appropriate amount of corporate risk taking. Our study contributes to the accounting literature on target setting and corporate risk taking by identifying accounting performance goals as a tool in executive compensation contract design to influence risk taking. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting.


2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junaid Haider ◽  
Hong-Xing Fang

Purpose This paper aims to investigate whether a powerful chief executive officer (CEO) impacts corporate risk taking in the distinctive institutional and market setting of China? Second, in case such relationship exists, the paper further aims to investigate whether the presence of large shareholders affects it, and finally, whether this effect of large shareholders varies in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). Design/methodology/approach The authors have used a sample of 1,502 Chinese firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Sample period is 2008-2013. Besides conventional fixed-effect regression, dynamic panel data estimation (generalized method of moments) is applied to address the potential endogeneity. Findings The results show that CEO power is negatively related with corporate risk taking in two risk proxies, i.e. total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Second, the presence of large shareholders significantly affects this relationship, but does not change the primary negative relationship between CEO power and corporate risk taking. Finally, the results show that the relationship between CEO power and corporate risk taking is different in SOEs and NSOEs. The findings of this paper contend the organizational and behavioral theory viewpoint that individual decisions are more extreme. Practical implications This study provides useful implication for policymakers and suggests that while evaluating CEO’s performance, institutional and market settings should be considered. Originality/value This study provides new insights on the impact of CEO power on corporate risk taking under the two distinctive features in a developing country, i.e. presence of large shareholders and state-owned enterprises.


Economies ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Tran Thai Ha Nguyen ◽  
Massoud Moslehpour ◽  
Thi Thuy Van Vo ◽  
Wing-Keung Wong

Corporate risk-taking behavior and investment is a crucial factor in order to seek higher profits and a better trading strategy. Competitive advantage and innovation, while maintaining profitability and state ownership, are considered as crucial resources. Furthermore, it is essential to connect the short-term and long-term business and investment objectives plus stakeholder’s expectations to corporate sustainability and development. This connection is especially important in the context of transforming economies and getting better trading strategies. This study estimates the relationship between state ownership, profitability, corporate risk-taking behavior, and investment in Vietnam by using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methods. Using the data of 501 listed non-financial corporates during the period 2007–2015 from Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi Stock Exchanges, we find that profitability is determined as a factor to reduce corporate risk-taking acceptance caused by the chances of entrenchment. Meanwhile, the impact of state ownership on the risk appetite of corporate has a non-linear effect. In particular, state ownership reduces corporate risk-taking behavior and investment but yet increases the risk-taking behavior and investment when the state ownership rate exceeds a threshold. One the one hand, this implies that the low level of state ownership not only prevents risk-taking behavior and investment but also results in more severe agency problems, causing unsustainability due to the imbalance of interests among various stakeholders. On the other hand, a dominant role of state ownership concentration causes a boost in corporate risk-taking decision-making in investment and trading strategy, leveraging the connection of significant external resources to deal with uncertain problems. The study contributes to existing theories of corporate governance in the context of a socialist-oriented market.


2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 526-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zahid Irshad Younas ◽  
Christian Klein ◽  
Thorsten Trabert ◽  
Bernhard Zwergel

Purpose Corporate governance is a crucial factor when considering excessive corporate risk-taking. Since corporate boards play such an important role in corporate governance, the purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the impact of board composition and further board characteristics on excessive corporate risk-taking. Design/methodology/approach This study investigates listed firms from Germany and the USA from 2004 to 2015 based on data from Thomson Reuters Data Stream. The authors apply the fixed effect and random effect estimation method to demonstrate the impact of board composition on corporate risk-taking. Findings This study provides empirical evidence that an increase in the proportion of independent directors is associated with less corporate risk-taking. These effects are stronger among German firms. Lastly, the effects of board size and audit committee effectiveness (AUCE) on risk-taking have mixed results. Research limitations/implications The results favor continued efforts to strengthen the composition of corporate boards and improve the effectiveness of audit committees to curb unhealthy corporate risk-taking. The recommendations from the research will provide regulators and corporate management with the necessary information needed to design an appropriate independent board structure, and board size (BOSI). The research will, furthermore, fortify the indispensability of financial experts on audit committees. Originality/value This study contributes to the agency theory debate with these findings. Stronger board independence enables a better monitoring of the CEO, which leads to decision making based on a more appropriate level of risk.


2020 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan ◽  
Muhammad A. Cheema ◽  
Yimei Man

PurposeThe authors empirically examine the impact of the stand-alone risk committee on corporate risk-taking and firm value.Design/methodology/approachThe authors argue that the existence of a stand-alone risk committee enhances the quality of corporate governance, which reduces corporate risk-taking and strengthens the firm value that might improve investor protection.FindingsThe authors find corporate risk-taking decline significantly for firms that have a stand-alone risk committee compared with firms that have a joint audit and risk committee. The authors also find that the presence of a stand-alone risk committee is positively associated with firm value.Practical implicationsThe evidence is consistent with the proposition that firms with a stand-alone risk committee can effectively evaluate potential risks and implement a proper risk management system.Originality/valueThis is the first paper that investigates the association between the existence of a stand-alone risk committee and firm risk-taking in a multi-industry setting. Also, our research extends the association between a stand-alone risk committee and firm value.


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