Collective Dominance in EU Merger Control - Substantive Issues

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ioannis Kalozymis
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oliver Bretz ◽  
Marie Leppard

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-66
Author(s):  
Cormac O'Daly ◽  
Marilena Nteve ◽  
Su Şimşek ◽  
Virginia Del Pozo

2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 317-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas W. Wessely

Abstract “Antitrust is a hungry policy, always seeking new terrain to conquer as soon as it has won its victories and imposed rigid rules in older areas” (Bark, The Antitrust Paradox, 249 (1978)). The Airtours/First Choice, Schneider/Legrand and Tetra Laval/Side! mergers had all fallen prey to that hungry policy. In each of the cases, an increasingly expansive merger control enforcement had ventured on new ground. In June and October 2002, the Court annulled all three prohibition decisions. The Court's judgments mark a clear turning point in EU merger control.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document