Dissenting Opinions in the WTO Appellate Body: Drivers of Their Issuance & Implications for the Institutional Jurisprudence

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evan Y. Kim ◽  
Petros C. Mavroidis
Keyword(s):  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

Extraterritorial Shrimps, NGOs and the WTO Appellate Body

1999 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 199-206 ◽  
Author(s):  
Asif H. Qureshi
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Market Access ◽  
The United States ◽  
Consultation Process ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Dispute Settlement ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

At the centre of the international trading order, under the framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO), lies a dispute-settlement system. This system offers a graduated conflict-resolution mechanism that begins with a consultation process; progresses to adjudication, through a panel system, and ends in an appellate process.1 Under this machinery, in October 1996 India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand (the complainants) requested joint consultations with the United States, regarding the US prohibition on the importation of certain shrimps and shrimp products caught with fishing technology considered by the United States adversely to affect the population of sea turtles—an endangered species under CITES.2 The US prohibition arose from section 609 of Public Law 101–1623 and associated regulations and judicial rulings (hereafter referred to as section 609). In a nutshell the complainants claimed denial of market access to their exports, and the United States justified this on grounds of conservation. However, as a consequence of the failure of the consultations, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body established a panel, around April 1997, to consider a joint complaint against the United States in relation to section 609. Australia, Ecuador, the European Communities, HongKong, China, Mexico and Nigeria joined the complainants as third parties. In May 1998 the panel's report was published, containing a decision in favour of the complainants. In July 1998 the United States appealed to the WTO Appellate Body, and in October 1998 the Appellate Body issued its report.4

scholarly journals Trade in Environmental Goods: A Review of the WTO Appellate Body's Ruling in US‒Countervailing Measures (China)

2016 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-349 ◽  
Author(s):  
RACHEL BREWSTER ◽  
CLAIRE BRUNEL ◽  
ANNA MARIA MAYDA
Keyword(s):  
Clean Energy ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Economic Point ◽  
Environmental Goods ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Policy Tool ◽  
The Us ◽  
Clean Energy Technology ◽  
Environmental Goals ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

AbstractIn this paper we claim that, in the WTO Appellate Body (AB)'s ruling in US‒Countervailing Measures (China), the AB decision has not put in question the practice of imposing countervailing duties (CVDs). While the US has formally ‘lost’ the case, a change in the procedures and tests used to motivate the CVD will allow the US to continue using this policy tool on the specified products. From an economic point of view, this is not welcome news since CVDs have the standard distortionary effects of tariffs and could go against environmental goals. From a political-economy point of view, the CVDs in this case appear driven by pressure of domestic manufacturers of clean energy technology and products.

Living without the WTO Appellate Body – Procedural Developments in International Trade Dispute Settlement

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 166-190
Author(s):  
Andrea Hamann
Keyword(s):  
International Trade ◽  
World Trade ◽  
Dispute Settlement ◽  
Free Trade Agreements ◽  
Trade Agreements ◽  
Settlement System ◽  
Trade Dispute ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
Dispute Settlement System

Abstract The current column covers selected procedural and institutional developments in international trade dispute settlement in 2020. During the reporting period, World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement has been facing unprecedented challenges due to the collapse of the Appellate Body. While this calls for a systemic reflection in the WTO forum regarding the future not only of appellate review but of the entire dispute settlement system, the current unavailability of the Appellate Body has triggered WTO Members into improvising temporary solutions. At the same time, some of them have equally seemed to turn to free trade agreements (FTAs) or otherwise to pursue solutions outside of the multilateral forum.

scholarly journals The Collapse of the Appellate Body as a Determining Factor of the WTO’s Future

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 238-255
Author(s):  
Hryhorii M. Kalachyhin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
World Order ◽  
The United States ◽  
Economic Regulation ◽  
Trade Disputes ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
The World ◽  
Shifting Balance ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
The U.S

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the leading institutions involved in global economic regulation. Its purposes are to ensure multilateral cooperation on the liberalization of international trade, harmonize existing standards and requirements, and peacefully resolve trade disputes between countries. Since 11 December 2019, dispute resolution has been handicapped due to the consistent blocking of the appointment of members to the WTO Appellate Body (AB) by the United States. This has reduced the multilateral trading system’s (MTS) predictability and threatens its final decay. In this article, the fundamental and formal causes of the collapse are described, and its circumvention mechanisms and effectiveness are discussed. At the same time, an assessment is given of the possibility to overcome the collapse in 2021, considering the change of the U.S. president and other events. Special attention is paid to Russia’s position and its current and potential losses. Finally, the issue of dispute resolution through regional trade agreements is proposed for discussion. The fundamental reasons for the collapse were the shifting balance of power in the world order and the WTO’s inflexibility in adjusting the rulebook and its procedures. The main reasons for the U.S.’ dissatisfaction are objective but based on formalities; the blockage of the AB is an overreaction. Moreover, the U.S.’ position on this issue has not changed with the new president. As a result, there is abuse of the current situation as WTO members file appeals “into the void.” Existing tools to circumvent the collapse are partial and not yet popular among WTO members. Russia needs to resume the AB’s work to complete previously started high-profile disputes and to defend its interests in the future.

A Comment on Henry Gao, ‘Dictum on Dicta: Obiter Dicta in WTO Disputes’

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (3) ◽  
pp. 535-540 ◽  
Author(s):  
GIORGIO SACERDOTI
Keyword(s):  
Appellate Body ◽  
The Us ◽  
Wto Appellate Body

In 2016, the US objected to the reappointment of a member of the WTO Appellate Body, ‘accusing’ him inter alia of having participated in a decision where the Appellate Body had indulged in unnecessary analysis in the nature of obiter dicta. Henry Gao has used the occasion to investigate, with a fresh approach, the very concept of obiter dicta in international jurisprudence.

scholarly journals National Tax Regulation, Voluntary International Standards, and the GATS: Argentina–Financial Services

2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
PANAGIOTIS DELIMATSIS ◽  
BERNARD HOEKMAN
Keyword(s):  
Tax Evasion ◽  
Financial Services ◽  
International Standards ◽  
Appellate Body ◽  
International Body ◽  
Regulatory Regimes ◽  
National Tax ◽  
Wto Appellate Body ◽  
The Right ◽  
Financial Transactions

AbstractCan a WTO Member discriminate against foreign suppliers of services located in jurisdictions that refuse to share information with a government to permit it to determine if its nationals engage in tax evasion? Does it matter if the Member uses standards developed by an international body as the criterion for deciding whether to impose measures? In Argentina–Financial Services, the WTO Appellate Body held that services from jurisdictions that share financial tax information may be different from services provided by jurisdictions that do not cooperate in supplying such information. It overruled a Panel finding that measures to increase taxes on financial transactions with non-cooperative jurisdictions were discriminatory. We argue that the AB reached the right conclusion on the basis of the wrong arguments; that it missed an important opportunity to clarify what WTO Members are permitted to do to enforce their domestic regulatory regimes; and increased the scope for confusion and future litigation by considering that the likeness of services and service suppliers may be a function of prevailing domestic regulatory regimes.

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