Vote Trading in Power-Sharing Systems: A Laboratory Investigation

Vote trading in power-sharing systems: A laboratory investigation*

The Economic Journal ◽

10.1093/ej/ueaa105 ◽

2020 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Nikolas Tsakas ◽

Dimitrios Xefteris ◽

Nicholas Ziros

Keyword(s):

Laboratory Experiment ◽

Laboratory Investigation ◽

Strong Evidence ◽

Electoral Systems ◽

Welfare Effects ◽

Vote Share ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Theoretical Predictions ◽

Vote Trading

Abstract Vote trading in power-sharing systems—i.e., systems in which a voter’s utility with respect to the election’s outcome is proportional to the vote share of her favourite party—is, in theory, welfare improving. However, trading votes for money in majoritarian systems may have detrimental welfare effects, especially when voters’ preference intensities are similar (Casella et al., 2012). We use a laboratory experiment to test the effect of vote trading in each of these popular electoral systems on voter welfare and find strong evidence in support of the above intuitions: vote trading in power-sharing systems boosts aggregate welfare across all considered specifications, but it is not welfare improving in majoritarian systems. Importantly, and contrary to theoretical predictions, a substantial share of subjects consistently lose from vote trading even in power-sharing systems, indicating that its welfare effects are not unambiguous.

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Strategic Vote Trading in Power Sharing Systems

American Economic Journal Microeconomics ◽

10.1257/mic.20150254 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 9 (2) ◽

pp. 76-94 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Dimitrios Xefteris ◽

Nicholas Ziros

Keyword(s):

Private Information ◽

Vote Share ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Strategic Vote ◽

Strategic Market Games ◽

Market Games ◽

Generic Existence ◽

Vote Trading ◽

Strategic Market

This paper studies decentralized vote trading in a power sharing system that follows the rules of strategic market games. In particular, we study a two-party election in which prior to the voting stage, voters are free to trade votes for money. Voters hold private information about both their ordinal and cardinal preferences, whereas their utilities are proportionally increasing in the vote share of their favorite party. In this framework, we prove generic existence of a unique full trade equilibrium (an equilibrium in which nobody refrains from vote trading). Moreover, we argue that vote trading in such systems unambiguously improves voters' welfare. (JEL C72, D71, D72, D82)

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Power Sharing and Democracy in Post-Civil War States

10.1017/9781108775724 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Caroline A. Hartzell ◽

Matthew Hoddie

Keyword(s):

Civil War ◽

Power Sharing

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Governing Diversity: Reflections on the Doctrine and Tradition of Religious Accommodation in Islam

Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization ◽

10.32350/jitc.102.11 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 10 (2) ◽

Author(s):

Dr. Muhammad Mushtaq ◽

Muhammad Riaz Mahmood

Keyword(s):

Power Sharing ◽

Primary Concern ◽

Peaceful Coexistence ◽

Religious Traditions ◽

Faith Based ◽

Religious Accommodation ◽

Pluralistic Approach ◽

Inclusive Governance ◽

Multicultural Policies ◽

Islamic Values

The problématique of governing diversity has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention but literature has largely overlooked the challenges appertaining to growing religious diversity in many places. The contemporary power sharing models and multicultural policies which are of a secular nature fall short of the expectations to foster peaceful coexistence in multi-religious societies. The primary concern of this paper is to manifest how religion can help us to lessen faith based violence. It is argued that religious traditions may offer valuable insights to design more inclusive governance. In this backdrop, the current paper evaluates the Islamic values of religious accommodation to gauge how helpful they are for designing inclusive policies in religiously diverse societies. The analysis illustrates that Islamic doctrine contemplates the politics of accommodation and forbearance. The pluralistic approach of Islam offered religious autonomy to non-Muslims in the state of Madinah. The ‘millet system’ established by the Ottoman Empire is widely admired for granting non-territorial autonomy in the matters related to religion, culture, and personal laws to non-Muslims. This display of an Islamic pluralistic approach at different junctures of Muslim history attests the capacity of the Islamic values of accommodation to nurture peaceful coexistence in modern societies. However, it requires a more unbiased and rigorous analysis to convince the global audience in this regard.

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Classical Greek Oligarchy

10.23943/princeton/9780691174976.001.0001 ◽

2017 ◽

Cited By ~ 3

Author(s):

Matthew Simonton

Keyword(s):

Public Space ◽

Political Institutions ◽

Social Science Research ◽

Science Research ◽

Power Sharing ◽

Majority Population ◽

New Development ◽

The Face ◽

Changes Over Time ◽

Client Relations

This book thoroughly reassesses an important but neglected form of government in ancient Greece, the “rule of the few.” The book challenges scholarly orthodoxy by showing that oligarchy was not the default mode of politics from time immemorial, but instead emerged alongside, and in reaction to, democracy. It establishes how oligarchies maintained power in the face of potential citizen resistance. It argues that oligarchs designed distinctive political institutions—such as intra-oligarchic power sharing, targeted repression, and rewards for informants—to prevent collective action among the majority population while sustaining cooperation within their own ranks. To clarify the workings of oligarchic institutions, the book draws on recent social science research on authoritarianism. Like modern authoritarian regimes, ancient Greek oligarchies had to balance coercion with co-optation in order to keep their subjects disorganized and powerless. The book investigates topics such as control of public space, the manipulation of information, and the establishment of patron–client relations, frequently citing parallels with contemporary nondemocratic regimes. It also traces changes over time in antiquity, revealing the processes through which oligarchy lost the ideological battle with democracy for legitimacy. This book represents a major new development in the study of ancient politics. It fills a longstanding gap in our knowledge of nondemocratic government while greatly improving our understanding of forms of power that continue to affect us today.

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