An Empirical Analysis of the Performance of Hedge Funds Over the Period 1998 to 2003 in Terms of Incentive Fees, Management Fees, Size, Age, Hurdle Rate, High Watermark Provision and Lockup Period

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Guirguis
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Management Fees ◽  
Hurdle Rate ◽  
Lockup Period

Hedge Fund Activism vs Other Activist Investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 252-282
Author(s):  
Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal ◽  
Jan Schnitzler
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Shareholder Proposals ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
The Impact

This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds. The aim is a comparative approach contrasting the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms with outcomes for other types of activist investors. Following recent research, the chapter provides an empirical analysis based on the disclosure of equity blockholdings by activist investors in a large sample of all US listed companies. In addition, it summarizes which types of investors engage in other events linked to activism, such as takeovers, proxy contests, or shareholder proposals. Overall, there is evidence that not only hedge funds but also other types of investors can be effective monitors, but there are nuanced differences with respect to targeting decisions and payout policies.

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