Loan Syndication Structures and Price Collusion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jian Cai ◽  
Frederik Eidam ◽  
Anthony Saunders ◽  
Sascha Steffen
Keyword(s):  
Price Collusion

Ensuring Competition in the Telecommunication Business Environment in Ghana

2014 ◽  
pp. 73-87
Author(s):  
Stephen E. Armah
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Relevant Literature ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Regulatory Body ◽  
Telecommunication Sector ◽  
Price Collusion ◽  
The Impact

This chapter investigates the possibility of anti-competitive behavior in the Ghana telecommunication sector and determines exploratorily if there is a need for the enactment of anti-trust laws to protect social welfare. The chapter first evaluates the available relevant literature on the subject, assesses the current situation, evaluates the current market structure, and identifies how market power is affecting consumer welfare. Reviews of available literature and secondary data were conducted to establish the relevant conditions for the applicability of such a law. Next, primary data was collected from stakeholders to solicit views on the impact of market structure on pricing and the need for anti-trust laws. Results suggest the Ghana telecommunication sector is open to “cartelization,” which can result in different forms of price collusion despite the existence of a state regulatory body (The National Communications Authority, NCA). The study highlights the Ghanaian consumers' susceptibility to unfair marketing practices due to the possible absence of pertinent anti-trust legislation.

Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis

1977 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur G. Frass ◽  
Douglas F. Greer
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Price Collusion

Advertising Rivalry in the U. S. Automobile Industry: A Test of Bain's Hypothesis

1994 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 40-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lall B. Ramrattan
Keyword(s):  
Automobile Industry ◽  
Serial Correlation ◽  
Product Characteristic ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Solution Concepts ◽  
Network Television ◽  
Price Collusion ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

This paper examines Bain's Hypothesis that firms in the automobile industry engage in advertising competition and price collusion. It develops a game theoretic model, basing price on product characteristic and advertising on pure and mixed strategies. Solution concepts such as Cournot, Nash and Prisoner's dilemma are possible. The paper then moves into regression results of advertising outlays in newspaper, general magazines, spot television, and network television, given the firm's cashflow, OPEC influence, and Leader-follower hypotheses. When multicolinearity and serial correlation are adjusted for, the results corroborate Bain's advertising hypothesis with price collusion.

scholarly journals Price collusion, rationalisation and Admiralty oversight in British shipbuilding: The case of the Warship Group, 1926–1945

2021 ◽  
pp. 084387142110376
Author(s):  
Christopher W. Miller ◽  
Hugh Murphy
Keyword(s):  
Opposite Effect ◽  
Private Firms ◽  
Price Collusion ◽  
Catalytic Role

Between 1925 and 1935, several private firms capable of constructing warships, or parts thereof, collapsed, merged or were partly or fully ‘sterilised’ against any return to shipbuilding during a period of ‘rationalisation’ to reduce perceived overcapacity relative to demand in British shipbuilding. Thereafter, rearmament had the opposite effect upon industry; lack of capacity in some key areas created almost unprecedented demand, and led eventually to uncontrolled price collusion and profits, particularly on warship contracts. An investigation into profiteering was undertaken in 1943, which embarrassed the remaining builders and their principal contractors. This article establishes that the Admiralty had allowed a form of price-fixing at taxpayers’ expense to proliferate for some time, a largely unknown episode that spanned the years of disarmament and rearmament. Further, it explains how and why collusion occurred when it did, and discusses the catalytic role of shipyard rationalisation. Finally, we conclude by suggesting reasons for such loose Admiralty control of warship costs during rearmament.

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