scholarly journals The Role of Central Bank Knowledge and Trust for the Public's Inflation Expectations

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sathya Mellina ◽  
Tobias Schmidt
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Inflation Expectations

Monetary Policy Committees and Central Bank Communication

2020 ◽  
pp. 19-44
Author(s):  
Nicole Baerg
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Size Composition ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Central Bank Communication ◽  
Central Bank Transparency ◽  
Key Policy

This chapter starts by tracing trends in central bank transparency. It reports key policy changes by some of the world’s most important central banks: the FOMC, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, and the Bank of Japan. The second section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on central bank design, paying close attention to the role of committee size, composition, and decision-making protocol, and classifies central banks around the world according to these features. The third section outlines the aim of central bank communications: to broadcast news and to reduce noise. The author argues that while previous literature has examined both committee design and central bank communications, it has done so in isolation. By putting these two topics together, the chapter argues that we can better understand, first, how different types of committees may be better at communicating and, second, how communication affects households’ inflation expectations and inflation.

Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions

2014 ◽  
Vol 69 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Bodea ◽  
Raymond Hicks
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Money Demand ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Price Stability ◽  
Inflation Expectations ◽  
The Past ◽  
Political Interference ◽  
Yearly Data

AbstractDespite mixed empirical evidence, in the past two decades central bank independence (CBI) has been on the rise under the assumption that it ensures price stability. Using an encompassing theoretical approach and new yearly data for de jure CBI (seventy-eight countries, 1973–2008), we reexamine this relationship, distinguishing the role of printing less money (discipline) from the public's beliefs about the central bank's likely actions (credibility). Democracies differ from dictatorships in the likelihood of political interference and changes to the law because of the presence of political opposition and the freedom to expose government actions. CBI in democracies should be directly reflected in lower money supply growth. Besides being more disciplinarian, it also ensures a more robust money demand by reducing inflation expectations and, therefore, inflation. Empirical results are robust and support a discipline effect conditioned by political institutions, as well as a credibility effect.

Who moved the Market? Analyzing the role of Central Bank speeches

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abhinav Anand ◽  
Sankarshan Basu ◽  
Jalaj Pathak ◽  
Ashok Thampy
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank

scholarly journals Money Decentralization under Direct Democracy Procedures. The Case of Classical Athens

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Emmanouil-Marios L. Economou ◽  
Nicholas C. Kyriazis ◽  
Nikolaos A. Kyriazis
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Direct Democracy ◽  
Hellenistic Period ◽  
International Currency ◽  
Monetary System ◽  
Mediterranean World ◽  
The Stability ◽  
City State

By analyzing the case of Athens during the Classical period (508-323 BCE) the main thesis of this paper is that under direct democracy procedures and the related institutional setup, a monetary system without a Central Bank may function relatively well. We focus on the following issues: (i) Τhe procedures of currency issuing in the Athenian city-state, (ii) why the Athenian drachma become the leading international currency in the Mediterranean world (iii) how and towards which targets monetary policy without a Central Bank was possible (iv) defining the targets of monetary policy and the mechanisms for its implementation (v) the role of money in the economy (vi) the issue of deficit spending (vii) the reasons of the replacement of the Athenian drachma as a leading currency by others from the Hellenistic period onwards (viii) the correlation of our findings regarding the decentralized character of monetary policy in Classical Athens to today’s realities, such as the issue of cryptocurrencies. Our analysis shows that monetary policy without a Central Bank was possible, with its foremost aim being the stability of the currency (mainly, silver coins) in order to enhance trust in it and so, make it an international currency which could outcompete other currencies. Since there was no Central Bank like today, monetary policy decisions were taken by the popular assembly of citizens in combination with the market forces themselves.

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