Small Shareholder Participation in European AGMs

AbstractWe examine the relation between the shareholder base and payout policy. Consistent with the idea that the shareholder base is related to the cost of external financing, we find that firms with small shareholder bases have lower payout levels and maintain higher cash holdings. We show that undertaking an open market repurchase results in a significant reduction in the size of the shareholder base. Consequently, we find that firms with small shareholder bases are less likely to undertake a repurchase (reduce the shareholder base even further) and are more likely to pay special dividends.

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Brokerage commissions and the small shareholder

Journal of Business Research ◽

10.1016/s0148-2963(73)80009-8 ◽

1973 ◽

Vol 1 (2) ◽

pp. 193-200

Author(s):

Richard A. Stevenson

Keyword(s):

Brokerage Commissions ◽

Small Shareholder

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The Small Shareholder

Survey Research for Managers ◽

10.1007/978-1-349-20698-8_7 ◽

1990 ◽

pp. 149-169

Author(s):

Peter F. Hutton

Keyword(s):

Small Shareholder

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Can Small Shareholders Protect Their Interests from Expropriation: The Case of a Chinese Bank

Management and Organization Review ◽

10.1017/mor.2019.23 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 16 (1) ◽

pp. 139-168

Author(s):

Mahmoud Ezzamel ◽

Jason Zezhong Xiao ◽

Rongli Yuan

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Shareholder Activism ◽

Convertible Bonds ◽

Network Density ◽

Controlling Shareholders ◽

Principal Problem ◽

Large Shareholders ◽

Identity Based ◽

Small Shareholder

ABSTRACTThis article examines how small shareholders protected their interests from large shareholders’ expropriation by forming an alliance and taking collective action to block a convertible bonds issue by a Chinese bank that they considered harmful. Forming an alliance strengthened small shareholders’ network density, enhanced their salience (power, legitimacy, and urgency), and reduced the bank's centrality. This enabled small shareholders to change their strategy from being a subordinator to a compromiser and forced the controlling shareholders and their representatives to change their strategy from a commander to a compromiser. Apart from interest-based motives, the alliance provided small shareholders with identity-based incentives to persistently oppose expropriation by controlling shareholders. This article enriches the literature on small shareholder activism and principal-principal problem.

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