Costly Entry and the Optimality of Asymmetric Auction Designs

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Bernhardt ◽  
Tingjun Liu ◽  
Takeharu Sogo
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Auction

scholarly journals How Accurately Do Structural Asymmetric First-Price Auction Estimates Represent True Valuations?

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirill Chernomaz ◽  
Hisayuki Yoshimoto
Keyword(s):  
Field Data ◽  
Empirical Studies ◽  
Estimation Methods ◽  
Auction Market ◽  
True Value ◽  
Statistical Equivalence ◽  
Asymmetric Auction ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Kolmogorov Smirnov ◽  
Smirnov Test

AbstractStructural asymmetric first-price auction estimation methods have provided numerous empirical studies. However, due to the latent nature of underlying valuations, the accuracy of estimates is not feasibly testable with field data, a fact that could inhibit empirical auction market designs and applications based on structural estimates. To assess their accuracy, we provide an analysis of estimates derived from experimental asymmetric auction data, in which researchers observe valuations. We test the null of statistical equivalence between the estimated and true value distributions against the alternative of non-equivalence. When advanced models are used, the Modified Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the distributional equivalence, supporting structural asymmetric auction estimations for auction market studies. In addition, recovered efficiencies have plus-minus 2.5 percent precision, compared to the true efficiencies.

Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India

2008 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Banerji ◽  
J.V. Meenakshi
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Structural Estimation ◽  
Specific Form ◽  
North India ◽  
Grain Markets ◽  
Competitive Outcome ◽  
Auction Models ◽  
Asymmetric Auction

Abstract This paper undertakes structural estimation of asymmetric auction models in a market for basmati, and detects the presence of a cartel consisting of a large (in market share) local miller and commission agents purchasing for large distant millers. The contracts between the distant millers and their commission agents help to explain the specific form that collusion takes. Simulations indicate that (i) the cartel gains considerably by colluding, over the competitive outcome; (ii) however, sellers (farmers) do not lose significantly under collusion when the commission agents bid. The paper also shows that efficient collusion, the form of collusion commonly assumed in the literature, does not explain the data well.

Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs

2003 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Werner Güth ◽  
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Auction

scholarly journals Revenue Comparison in Asymmetric Auctions with Discrete Valuations

2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 429-461 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicola Doni ◽  
Domenico Menicucci
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Unique Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Outcome ◽  
Asymmetric Auctions ◽  
First Order ◽  
Reserve Prices ◽  
Revenue Comparison ◽  
Asymmetric Auction ◽  
Price Auction ◽  
Second Price Auction

AbstractWe consider an asymmetric auction setting with two bidders such that the valuation of each bidder has a binary support. First, we characterize the unique equilibrium outcome in the first price auction for any values of parameters. Then we compare the first price auction with the second price auction in terms of expected revenue. Under the assumption that the probabilities of low values are the same for the two bidders, we obtain two main results: (i) the second price auction yields a higher revenue unless the distribution of a bidder’s valuation first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of the other bidder’s valuation “in a strong sense” and (ii) introducing reserve prices implies that the first price auction is never superior to the second price auction. In addition, in some cases, the revenue in the first price auction decreases when all the valuations increase.

scholarly journals A First-Price Sealed-Bid Asymmetric Auction When Two Bidders Have Respective CRRA and General Utility Functions

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Mingming Gong ◽  
Shulin Liu
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Existence And Uniqueness ◽  
Allocative Efficiency ◽  
Relative Risk Aversion ◽  
General Utility ◽  
Sealed Bid ◽  
Concave Utility Function ◽  
Asymmetric Auction ◽  
Price Auction

We study a first-price auction with two bidders where one bidder is characterized by a constant relative risk aversion utility function (i.e., a concave power function) while the other has a general concave utility function. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the optimal strategic markups and analyze the effects of one bidder’s risk aversion level on the optimal strategic markups of him and his opponent’s, the allocative efficiency of the auction, and the seller’s expected revenue, respectively.

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