scholarly journals Existence, Uniqueness, and Algorithm for Identifying Free Riders in Multiple Public Good Games: Replacement Function Approach

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken-ichi Suzuki ◽  
Jun-ichi Itaya ◽  
Akitomo Yamanashi ◽  
Tatsuyoshi Miyakoshi
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Function Approach ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Public Good Games

scholarly journals Fractional Punishment of Free Riders to Improve Cooperation in Optional Public Good Games

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 17
Author(s):  
Rocio Botta ◽  
Gerardo Blanco ◽  
Christian E. Schaerer
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Phase Portrait ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Public Good Game ◽  
Group Project ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
State Evolution ◽  
Public Good Games ◽  
Full Cooperation

Improving and maintaining cooperation are fundamental issues for any project to be time-persistent, and sanctioning free riders may be the most applied method to achieve it. However, the application of sanctions differs from one group (project or institution) to another. We propose an optional, public good game model where a randomly selected set of the free riders is punished. To this end, we introduce a parameter that establishes the portion of free riders sanctioned with the purpose to control the population state evolution in the game. This parameter modifies the phase portrait of the system, and we show that, when the parameter surpasses a threshold, the full cooperation equilibrium point becomes a stable global attractor. Hence, we demonstrate that the fractional approach improves cooperation while reducing the sanctioning cost.

Efficiency and Stability of Sampling Equilibrium in Public Good Games

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cesar Mantilla ◽  
Rajiv Sethi ◽  
Juan-Camilo CCrdenas
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Public Good Games

scholarly journals Bringing tax avoiders to light: moral framing and shaming in a public goods experiment

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Stefanos A. Tsikas
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Social Dilemmas ◽  
Tax Avoidance ◽  
Social Contagion ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Social Sanctions ◽  
Moral Framing ◽  
Public Goods Experiment

Abstract With a linear public goods game played in six different variants, this article studies two channels that might moderate social dilemmas and increase cooperation without using pecuniary incentives: moral framing and shaming. We find that cooperation is increased when noncontributing to a public good is framed as morally debatable and socially harmful tax avoidance, while the mere description of a tax context has no effect. However, without social sanctions in place, cooperation quickly deteriorates due to social contagion. We find ‘shaming’ free-riders by disclosing their misdemeanor to act as a strong social sanction, irrespective of the context in which it is applied. Moralizing tax avoidance significantly reinforces shaming, compared with a simple tax context.

scholarly journals Cooperation in public good games. Calculated or confused?

2018 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 185-203 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timo Goeschl ◽  
Johannes Lohse
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Public Good Games

scholarly journals Training LSTM-neural networks on early warning signals of declining cooperation in simulated repeated public good games

MethodsX ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 100920
Author(s):  
Manfred Füllsack ◽  
Marie Kapeller ◽  
Simon Plakolb ◽  
Georg Jäger
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Early Warning ◽  
Warning Signals ◽  
Early Warning Signals ◽  
Public Good Games
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