On the Tension between Full Revelation and Earnings Management: A Reconsderation of the Revelation Principle

On the Tension between Full Revelation and Earnings Management: A Reconsiderastion of the Revelation Principle

Journal of Accounting Auditing & Finance ◽

10.1177/0148558x0201700401 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 17 (4) ◽

pp. 273-294 ◽

Cited By ~ 4

Author(s):

Tavy Ronen ◽

Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari

Keyword(s):

Earnings Management ◽

Truth Telling ◽

Revelation Principle ◽

Popular View ◽

Partial Suppression ◽

Fully Revealing Equilibrium ◽

Undominated Equilibrium ◽

Full Revelation

We challenge the popular view that because of the revelation principle, the research on earnings management must be restricted only to situations in which a truth-telling, fully revealing equilibrium/i> does not exist. After presenting and discussing the revelation principle, we state conditions under which truth-telling equilibria may be dominated by equilibria wherein the message (such as earnings) is managed. The optimal message in an undominated equilibrium may involve either partial suppression of information (omission of some data) or aggregation (summarization of data).

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Pengaruh Hubungan Politik Terhadap Manajemen Laba Pada Perusahaan Sektor Jasa Dengan Variabel Kontrol Ukuran Perusahaan Dan Kualitas Audit

Jurnal Keuangan dan Bisnis ◽

10.32524/jkb.v16i2.408 ◽

2018 ◽

Vol 16 (2) ◽

pp. 30

Author(s):

Dwikky Darmawan ◽

Weny Putri

Keyword(s):

Earnings Management ◽

Firm Size ◽

Significant Influence ◽

Service Sector ◽

Audit Quality ◽

Stock Exchange ◽

Secondary Data ◽

Annual Reports ◽

Political Connection ◽

Discretionary Accrual

The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of political connection toward the earnings management of service sector companies with control variables firm size and audit quality. Firm�s political connection measured by using dummy variable. Earnings management is proxied by discretionary accrual which is measured by using Modified Jones Model. The research data applied in this study are the secondary data which are taken from the annual reports of service sector companies that listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange of 2016-2017 periods. There are 330 observations fit as sample, which are taken by using purposive sampling method. Data are processed by applying the multiple linear regression test. The result show that the political connection had positive but not significant influence to earnings management. Firm size had negative but not significant influence to earnings management. Whereas the audit quality had a negative and significant influence to earnings management.

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The relation between R&D accounting treatment and the risk of the firm: Evidence from the Italian market

FINANCIAL REPORTING ◽

10.3280/fr2014-001002 ◽

2014 ◽

pp. 33-54 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Riccardo Cimini ◽

Alessandro Gaetano ◽

Alessandra Pagani

Keyword(s):

Earnings Management ◽

Fiscal Year ◽

Investment Strategies ◽

Capital Assets ◽

Italian Market ◽

D Investment ◽

Firm Evidence

In this paper, we investigate the relation between the different accounting treatments of R&D expenditures and the risk of the entity in order to identify under which treatment insiders are more likely to carry out earnings management. By analysing the R&D investment strategies of a sample of 137 listed Italian entities that complied with the requirements of IAS 38 during fiscal year 2009, following Lantz and Sahut (2005), we calculate several indexes that show the preferences of insiders to account R&D expenditures as costs or capital assets, and we study the relation of such preferences with the risk of the entity, which we measure with the unlevered beta. We hypothesize that the entities, which considered the R&D investments as costs, are the riskiest ones due to the higher probability that insiders carried out earnings management. Our results confirm such hypothesis. This paper could have implications for academics and standard setters that could learn that behind accounting discretion, insiders could opportunistically behave against outsiders.

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