scholarly journals Climate Change and the Irreversibility Effect - Combining Expected Utility and MaxiMin

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Lange
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Irreversibility Effect

Climate Change and Individual Obligations

2021 ◽  
pp. 201-221
Author(s):  
Julia Nefsky
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
General Feature ◽  
Collective Impact ◽  
Utility Approach

This chapter concerns the nature of our obligations as individuals when it comes to our emissions-producing activities and climate change. The first half of the chapter argues that the popular ‘expected utility’ approach to this question faces a problematic dilemma: either it gives skeptical verdicts, saying that there are no individual emissions-related obligations, or it yields implausibly strong verdicts. The second half of the chapter diagnoses the problem. It argues that the dilemma arises from a very general feature of the view, and thus is shared by other views as well. It then discusses what an account of our individual obligations needs to look like if it is to avoid the dilemma. Finally, the discussion is extended beyond climate change to other collective impact contexts.

Individual Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Climate Change

2014 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Galvin ◽  
John R. Harris
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Anthropogenic Climate Change ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Moral Responsibilities

AbstractThe problems caused by anthropogenic climate change threaten the lives and well-being of millions, yet it seems that we, as individuals, are powerless to prevent or worsen these problems. In this essay we consider the difficulty of assigning moral responsibility in cases of collective action problems like the problem of anthropogentic climate change. We consider two promising solutions, the expected utility and rights based solution, and argue that both are incapable of explaining why individuals have moral obligations to address collective action problems. We believe, however, that this result does not justify inaction, instead it reveals a failure of moral philosophy to adequately address collective action problems. More work must be done to address the moral responsibilities that arise in cases of collective action problems and we close by pointing in the direction of some promising work in this area.

scholarly journals A Small Chance of Disaster

2013 ◽  
Vol 21 (S1) ◽  
pp. S27-S31 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Broome
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Moral Judgement ◽  
Decisions Under Uncertainty

Expected utility theory tells us how we should make decisions under uncertainty: we should choose the option that leads to the greatest expectation of utility. This may, however, not be the option that is likely to produce the best result – that may be the wrong choice if it also creates a small chance of a great disaster. A small chance of disaster may be the most important consideration in decision making. Climate change creates a small chance of disaster, and some authors believe this to be the most important consideration in deciding our response to climate change. To know whether they are right, we need to make a moral judgement about just how bad the disaster would be.

Multiple Beliefs, Dominance and Dynamic Consistency

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tommi Ekholm ◽  
Erin Baker
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
A Priori ◽  
Decision Rules ◽  
Dynamic Consistency ◽  
Subjective Expected Utility ◽  
Dynamic Inconsistency ◽  
Real World Problem ◽  
Second Period

This paper investigates multiperiod decisions under multiple beliefs. We explore the dynamic consistency of both complete and incomplete orderings. We focus on a dominance concept that supports decision-making under multiple characterizations of uncertainty by ruling out strategies that are dominated across a set of beliefs. We uncover a distinction between two types of dynamic inconsistency, which we label fallacious and fallible inconsistency. Fallacious inconsistency occurs when an a priori optimal strategy is suboptimal in the second period, thus requiring the decision-maker to depart from the original strategy. Fallible inconsistency occurs when an a priori suboptimal second-period action ceases being suboptimal from the perspective of the second-period preferences. We introduce corresponding definitions of dynamic consistency and show that the two types of consistency are equivalent for complete orderings, but differ for incomplete orderings. Subjective expected utility is dynamically consistent and non-expected-utility decision rules, such as minmax, are not. We show that the dominance relation over beliefs falls between these two: it is immune to the more severe fallacious inconsistency, but not to the less problematic fallible inconsistency. We illustrate the method and concepts using a numerical example addressing a focal, real-world problem of risk and ambiguity regarding climate change. This paper was accepted by Ilia Tsetlin, decision analysis.

Averting robo-bees: why free-flying robotic bees are a bad idea

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (6) ◽  
pp. 723-729
Author(s):  
Roslyn Gleadow ◽  
Jim Hanan ◽  
Alan Dorin
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Computer Simulation ◽  
Food Security ◽  
European Countries ◽  
Plant Interactions ◽  
Plant Insect Interactions ◽  
Native Habitat ◽  
Insect Pollinators ◽  
Insect Interactions

Food security and the sustainability of native ecosystems depends on plant-insect interactions in countless ways. Recently reported rapid and immense declines in insect numbers due to climate change, the use of pesticides and herbicides, the introduction of agricultural monocultures, and the destruction of insect native habitat, are all potential contributors to this grave situation. Some researchers are working towards a future where natural insect pollinators might be replaced with free-flying robotic bees, an ecologically problematic proposal. We argue instead that creating environments that are friendly to bees and exploring the use of other species for pollination and bio-control, particularly in non-European countries, are more ecologically sound approaches. The computer simulation of insect-plant interactions is a far more measured application of technology that may assist in managing, or averting, ‘Insect Armageddon' from both practical and ethical viewpoints.

Modelling ecosystem adaptation and dangerous rates of global warming

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-231 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rebecca Millington ◽  
Peter M. Cox ◽  
Jonathan R. Moore ◽  
Gabriel Yvon-Durocher
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Global Warming ◽  
Diffusion Rate ◽  
Individual Species ◽  
Genetic Evolution ◽  
Rates Of Change ◽  
Rapid Climate Change ◽  
Warming Climate ◽  
Intraspecies Competition ◽  
High Trait

Abstract We are in a period of relatively rapid climate change. This poses challenges for individual species and threatens the ecosystem services that humanity relies upon. Temperature is a key stressor. In a warming climate, individual organisms may be able to shift their thermal optima through phenotypic plasticity. However, such plasticity is unlikely to be sufficient over the coming centuries. Resilience to warming will also depend on how fast the distribution of traits that define a species can adapt through other methods, in particular through redistribution of the abundance of variants within the population and through genetic evolution. In this paper, we use a simple theoretical ‘trait diffusion’ model to explore how the resilience of a given species to climate change depends on the initial trait diversity (biodiversity), the trait diffusion rate (mutation rate), and the lifetime of the organism. We estimate theoretical dangerous rates of continuous global warming that would exceed the ability of a species to adapt through trait diffusion, and therefore lead to a collapse in the overall productivity of the species. As the rate of adaptation through intraspecies competition and genetic evolution decreases with species lifetime, we find critical rates of change that also depend fundamentally on lifetime. Dangerous rates of warming vary from 1°C per lifetime (at low trait diffusion rate) to 8°C per lifetime (at high trait diffusion rate). We conclude that rapid climate change is liable to favour short-lived organisms (e.g. microbes) rather than longer-lived organisms (e.g. trees).

Climate change and breeding success: decline of the capercaillie in Scotland

2001 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Moss ◽  
James Oswald ◽  
David Baines
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Breeding Success
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document