scholarly journals Child Care, Parental Labor Supply and Tax Revenue

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Eckhoff Andresen ◽  
Tarjei Havnes
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. 101762 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin Eckhoff Andresen ◽  
Tarjei Havnes
Keyword(s):  

SERIEs ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-406 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nezih Guner ◽  
Javier López-Segovia ◽  
Roberto Ramos

AbstractCan the Spanish government generate more tax revenue by making personal income taxes more progressive? To answer this question, we build a life-cycle economy with uninsurable labor productivity risk and endogenous labor supply. Individuals face progressive taxes on labor and capital incomes and proportional taxes that capture social security, corporate income, and consumption taxes. Our answer is yes, but not much. A reform that increases labor income taxes for individuals who earn more than the mean labor income and reduces taxes for those who earn less than the mean labor income generates a small additional revenue. The revenue from labor income taxes is maximized at an effective marginal tax rate of 51.6% (38.9%) for the richest 1% (5%) of individuals, versus 46.3% (34.7%) in the benchmark economy. The increase in revenue from labor income taxes is only 0.82%, while the total tax revenue declines by 1.55%. The higher progressivity is associated with lower aggregate labor supply and capital. As a result, the government collects higher taxes from a smaller economy. The total tax revenue is higher if marginal taxes are raised only for the top earners. The increase, however, must be substantial and cover a large segment of top earners. The rise in tax collection from a 3 percentage points increase on the top 1% is just 0.09%. A 10 percentage points increase on the top 10% of earners (those who earn more than €41,699) raises total tax revenue by 2.81%.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 177-215
Author(s):  
Junichi Minagawa ◽  
Thorsten Upmann

AbstractIn this paper, we present a model of a one-parent, one-child household where parental decisions on labor supply, leisure, and the demand for parental and public child care are simultaneously endogenized and intertemporally determined. We characterize the path of the optimal decisions and investigate the effects of various public child care fees and of the quality of public child care services on the parent’s time allocation and the child’s performance level. Our results show that different public child care policies may induce substantially diverging effects and reveal that each policy frequently faces a trade off between an encouragement of labor supply and an enhancement of the child’s performance. In addition, we find that, from an efficiency perspective, an income-based fee levied on public child care services is dominated by both a flat fee and a use-based fee system.


1997 ◽  
Vol 79 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan L. Averett ◽  
H. Elizabeth Peters ◽  
Donald M. Waldman
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia F. Apps ◽  
Jan Kabatek ◽  
Ray Rees ◽  
Arthur H. O. <!>van Soest

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philippe Choné ◽  
David Leblanc ◽  
Isabelle Robert-Bobee

1992 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Michalopoulos ◽  
Philip K. Robins ◽  
Irwin Garfinkel

1999 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 430-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
Inmaculada García ◽  
José Alberto Molina
Keyword(s):  

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