scholarly journals Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gleb Romanyuk ◽  
Alex Smolin
Keyword(s):  
Information Design ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Cream Skimming

scholarly journals Cream Skimming and Information Design in Matching Markets

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 250-276 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gleb Romanyuk ◽  
Alex Smolin
Keyword(s):  
Calculus Of Variations ◽  
Information Disclosure ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Information Design ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Matching Markets ◽  
Coarse Information ◽  
Cream Skimming ◽  
Over Time

Short-lived buyers arrive to a platform over time and randomly match with sellers. The sellers stay at the platform and decide whether to accept incoming requests. The platform designs what buyer information the sellers observe before deciding to form a match. We show full information disclosure leads to a market failure because of excessive rejections by the sellers. If sellers are homogeneous, then coarse information policies are able to restore efficiency. If sellers are heterogeneous, then simple censorship policies are often constrained efficient as shown by a method of calculus of variations. (JEL C78, D82, D83)

Scenarios and Information Design

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary L Rice-Lively ◽  
Hsin-Liang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Information Design

Matching Markets via Descending Price

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bo Waggoner ◽  
Eric Glen Weyl
Keyword(s):  
Matching Markets

Implementation Via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Edward Morris ◽  
Daisuke Oyama ◽  
Satoru Takahashi
Keyword(s):  
Information Design ◽  
Supermodular Games
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