Costly Information Acquisition and Optimal Information Choice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kemal Ozbek
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Costly Information ◽  
Optimal Information

scholarly journals Information Acquisition and Its Incentives in an E-Commerce Supply Chain under the Offline Showroom Model

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (5) ◽  
pp. 1791-1804
Author(s):  
Mengli Li ◽  
Xumei Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Demand Forecast ◽  
Competition Intensity ◽  
Demand Information ◽  
Optimal Information ◽  
Acquisition Strategy ◽  
The One ◽  
The Impact

Recently, the showroom model has developed fast for allowing consumers to evaluate a product offline and then buy it online. This paper aims at exploring the optimal information acquisition strategy and its incentive contracts in an e-commerce supply chain with two competing e-tailers and an offline showroom. Based on signaling game theory, we build a mathematical model by considering the impact of experience service and competition intensity on consumers’ demand. We find that, on the one hand, information acquisition promotes supply chain members to obtain demand information directly or indirectly, which leads to forecast revenue. On the other hand, information acquisition promotes supply chain members to distort optimal decisions, which results in signal cost. The optimal information acquisition strategy depends on the joint impact of forecast revenue, signal cost and demand forecast cost. Notably, in some conditions, the offline showroom will not acquire demand information even when its cost is equal to zero. We also design two different information acquisition incentive contracts to obtain Pareto improvement for all supply chain members.

Costly information acquisition under horizontal competition

2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 418-423
Author(s):  
Qi Fu ◽  
Yongquan Li ◽  
Kaijie Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Costly Information ◽  
Horizontal Competition

scholarly journals Optimal Monitoring Design

Econometrica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 88 (5) ◽  
pp. 2075-2107 ◽  
Author(s):  
George Georgiadis ◽  
Balazs Szentes
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Minimal Cost ◽  
Threshold Policy ◽  
Agent Model ◽  
Monitoring Design ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Optimal Monitoring ◽  
Principal Agent Model ◽  
Optimal Information ◽  
Acquisition Strategy

This paper considers a Principal–Agent model with hidden action in which the Principal can monitor the Agent by acquiring independent signals conditional on effort at a constant marginal cost. The Principal aims to implement a target effort level at minimal cost. The main result of the paper is that the optimal information‐acquisition strategy is a two‐threshold policy and, consequently, the equilibrium contract specifies two possible wages for the Agent. This result provides a rationale for the frequently observed single‐bonus wage contracts.

scholarly journals Costly Information Acquisition, Social Networks, and Asset Prices: Experimental Evidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (4) ◽  
pp. 1975-2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
EDWARD HALIM ◽  
YOHANES E. RIYANTO ◽  
NILANJAN ROY
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Asset Prices ◽  
Costly Information

Data-Driven Online Recommender Systems with Costly Information Acquisition

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Onur Atan ◽  
Saeed Ghoorchian ◽  
Setareh Maghsudi ◽  
Mihaela van der Schaar Schaar
Keyword(s):  
Recommender Systems ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Data Driven ◽  
Costly Information
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