A Systematic Process for Evaluating Structured Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Asymmetric Information

Jonathan Levin, the 2011 recipient of the American Economic Association's John Bates Clark Medal, has established himself as a leader in the fields of industrial organization and microeconomic theory. Jon has made important contributions in many areas: the economics of contracts and organizations; market design; markets with asymmetric information; and estimation methods for dynamic games. Jon's combination of breadth and depth is remarkable, ranging from important papers in very distinct areas such as economic theory and econometric methods to applied work that seamlessly integrates theory with data. In what follows, we will attempt to do justice not only to Jon's academic work, but also try to sketch a broader portrait of Jon's other contributions to economics as a gifted teacher, dedicated advisor, and selfless provider of public goods.

Download Full-text

Structured perfect Bayesian equilibrium in infinite horizon dynamic games with asymmetric information

2016 54th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton) ◽

10.1109/allerton.2016.7852238 ◽

2016 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Abhinav Sinha ◽

Achilleas Anastasopoulos

Keyword(s):

Asymmetric Information ◽

Dynamic Games ◽

Infinite Horizon ◽

Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium ◽

Bayesian Equilibrium

Download Full-text

Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Empirical Work*

The Quarterly Journal of Economics ◽

10.1093/qje/qjs025 ◽

2012 ◽

Vol 127 (4) ◽

pp. 1611-1661 ◽

Cited By ~ 34

Author(s):

Chaim Fershtman ◽

Ariel Pakes

Keyword(s):

Asymmetric Information ◽

Empirical Research ◽

Private Information ◽

Dynamic Games ◽

Empirical Work ◽

Equilibrium Conditions ◽

Maintenance Decisions ◽

Meaningful Sense

Abstract We develop a framework for the analysis of dynamic oligopolies with persistant sources of asymmetric information that enables applied analysis of situations of empirical importance that have been difficult to deal with. The framework generates policies that are “relatively” easy for agents to use while still being optimal in a meaningful sense, and is amenable to empirical research in that its equilibrium conditions can be tested and equilibrium policies are relatively easy to compute. We conclude with an example that endogenizes the maintenance decisions of electricity generators when the costs states of the generators are private information.

Download Full-text