Pengepolitik i krise Fra ineffektiv rentepolitik til digitale centralbankpenge (Monetary Policy in Crisis - From Inefficient Interest Rate Policy to Central Bank Digital Currencies)

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasmus Hougaard Nielsen
2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (342) ◽  
pp. 89-116
Author(s):  
Irena Pyka ◽  
Aleksandra Nocoń

In the face of the global financial crisis, central banks have used unconventional monetary policy instruments. Firstly, they implemented the interest rate policy, lowering base interest rates to a very low (almost zero) level. However, in the following years they did not undertake normalizing activities. The macroeconomic environment required further initiatives. For the first time in history, central banks have adopted Negative Interest Rate Policy (NIRP). The main aim of the study is to explore the risk accompanying the negative interest rate policy, aiming at identifying channels and consequences of its impact on the economy. The study verifies the research hypothesis stating that the risk of negative interest rates, so far unrecognized in Theory of Interest Rate, is a consequence of low effectiveness of monetary policy normalization and may adopt systemic nature, by influencing – through different channels – the financial stability and growth dynamics of the modern world economy.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. G. Shelomentsev ◽  
D. B. Berg ◽  
A. A. Detkov ◽  
A. P. Rylova

2013 ◽  
Vol 850-851 ◽  
pp. 1003-1007
Author(s):  
Xiong Song He ◽  
Guo Lin Deng

Monetary policy has a significant effect on real estate price, and monetary policymakers need to have quick response. Based on the assumptions that monetary policy and real estate price influence each other and variables affect one another with a lag, A VAR model is designed and modified. Through impulse-response analysis and variance analysis, the influence of money supply and that of interest rate on real estate price are tested and compared. We found that: both money supply and interest rate could affect the real estate price; interest rate has a bigger influence that money supply does; as time goes on, the influence of money supply changes little, but that of interest rate enhances; interest rate policy is not easy to control and it will lead to a fluctuation of economy and the fluctuation may enhance, money supply is a better method to regulate real estate industry instead.


2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 2009-2034 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas E. Cone ◽  
Paul Shea

We assume that firms are more risk averse than households and that they manage their risk through a financial sector, which consists of learning and hedging. Firms that learn (by observing demand shocks) face less uncertainty and produce more than firms that hedge (by selling future production at a fixed price). If a policy or parameter change stabilizes the economy, then there is less learning and usually less production. Welfare, however, is usually maximized when the financial sector, which requires inputs but does not directly provide utility or affect production, is smallest. Monetary policy can improve welfare by either taxing learning or subsidizing hedging. If firms are risk averse over nominal profits instead of real profits, then interest rate policy can also improve welfare by stabilizing prices and thus minimizing the size of the financial sector.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
C. Patrick Scott

AbstractMuch has been written on how an active central bank produces inflation outcomes above and beyond what commitment policy would produce. This paper contributes to this body of literature by simulating from the state estimates of both commitment and discretionary policy equilibria in a familiar dynamic New–Keynesian framework. Optimal interest rate and inflation rate policies are derived under the two regimes for six developed economies. The model is estimated using Bayesian methods employing a random-walk Metropolis–Hastings algorithm. Optimal inflation and interest rate policies for each of the economies are simulated. Results suggest that the simulated inflation induced by discretionary policy is not significantly different from commitment policy after 2000 for five of the six countries (including the U.S). Simulated commitment interest rate policy is on average 1.9% higher at the center of the distribution, suggesting that discretionary interest rate policy is on average more often loose compared to commitment interest rate policy. Simulations of the average inflation deviation and welfare loss of discretion policy indicate are greatest when the central bank exhibits low preference for inflation targeting and high preference for output stability.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 48-75

This section conducts an estimate of the impulse response function of key macroeconomic variables to monetary policy shocks in Russia. The estimates are carried out through a dynamic factor model (DFM) of the Russian economy with structural identification of shocks by imposing various sets of sign restrictions on the behavior of endogenous variables. We restricted first the monetary aggregate M2 only (a decrease in response to an increase of the Key rate), and then—simultaneously—M2, real effective exchange rate (an increase), and GDP (a decrease). We estimated the DFM using a large dataset of 58 macroeconomic and financial variables. The estimation results suggest that there is no decreasing response of consumer prices to an exogenous tightening of the interest rate policy of the Central Bank of Russia. This empirical evidence is supported implicitly by DFM-based predictions that under the imposition of such a decreasing response as an identifying restriction to the model, a positive interest rate shock is not transmitted through the interest rate channel of monetary policy to expected increases of the interest rates on commercial loans and private deposits. However, existing empirical evidence refutes this model-based result. Therefore, this study supports the view according to which a tightening of monetary policy in Russia is inefficient in terms of restraining inflation. In addition, monetary policy shocks negatively affect investments, retail sales, export and import, real wages, and employment. Different economic activities react differently to monetary policy shocks: export-oriented activities are not sensitive to these shocks, whereas domestic pro-cyclical activities (e.g. construction) can be substantially depressed in response to unexpected increases of interest rates. Finally, the expectations of economic agents are also significantly affected by shocks in the interest rate policy of the Bank of Russia.


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