Information Advantage, Relationship Advantage and Competition in Banking

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yuri Matsumura
Keyword(s):  
Information Advantage

Analysts' Information Acquisition and Stock Price Synchronicity: A Regulatory Perspective from China

2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haiyan Jiang ◽  
Donghua Zhou ◽  
Joseph H. Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Insider Trading ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Specific Information ◽  
Stock Price Synchronicity ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Information Advantage ◽  
Private Information Acquisition

SYNOPSIS Against the backdrop of the Chinese Directive 40 (China's Reg FD) issued in 2007 as an attempt to curb insider trading and to level the information playing field, this study investigates whether analysts' private information acquisition influences the extent to which firm-specific information is impounded into stock prices, i.e., stock price synchronicity, and how the restrictions on selective disclosures imposed by Directive 40 have shaped the relationship between analyst information acquisition and synchronicity. Using a pre-Directive 40 sample, we show that synchronicity is negatively related to analysts' private information acquisition, which provides support for the “information advantage” argument of analysts' information production. However, the ability of analysts' private information acquisition in improving firm-specific information incorporated into stock price is mitigated post-Directive 40 due to a restriction on selective disclosures and/or private communication. Moreover, we find that this regulatory impact varies for firms being followed by affiliated analysts versus non-affiliated analysts. JEL Classifications: G14; G15; G17; G18.

Institutional Dual-Holders and Managers' Earnings Disclosure

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leila Peyravan ◽  
Regina Wittenberg-Moerman
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Effect ◽  
Commercial Bank ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Voluntary Disclosure ◽  
Information Environment ◽  
Earnings Forecast ◽  
Excess Returns ◽  
Lending Relationships ◽  
Playing Field ◽  
Information Advantage

We investigate how institutional (non-commercial bank) investors that simultaneously invest in a firm's debt and equity (dual-holders) influence the firm's voluntary disclosure. Because institutional dual-holders trade on private information gleaned through lending relationships, we predict and find that borrowers increase earnings forecast disclosure to reduce these investors' information advantage following the origination of loans with their participation. We also show that the increase in disclosure is stronger when the access to a borrower's private information endows dual-holders with a greater information advantage and when the consequences of this access are likely to be more pronounced. We further find that institutional dual-holders earn excess returns when trading equity of non-guider firms following loan origination, but not when firms issue guidance, confirming that earnings disclosure helps level the playing field among investors. Our findings highlight that firms actively use disclosure to mitigate the adverse effect of dual-holders on their information environment.

The exit option: mediation and the termination of negotiations in the Northern Ireland conflict

2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 40-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niall O´ Dochartaigh ◽  
Isak Svensson
Keyword(s):  
Northern Ireland ◽  
Third Party ◽  
British Government ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Irish Republican Army ◽  
Northern Ireland Conflict ◽  
Exit Option ◽  
Information Advantage ◽  
The Uk

PurposeThe purpose of this study is to examine the mediation exit option, which is one of the most important tactics available to any third party mediator.Design/methodology/approachThe paper analyzes a crucial intermediary channel between the Irish Republican Army (hereafter IRA) and the British Government utilizing unique material from the private papers of the intermediary, Brendan Duddy, including diaries that cover periods of intensive communication, extensive interviews with the intermediary and with participants in this communication on both the British Government and Irish Republican sides as well as recently released official papers from the UK National Archives relating to this communication.FindingsThe study reveals how the intermediary channel was used in order to get information, how the third party and the primary parties traded in asymmetries of information, and how the intermediary utilized the information advantage to increase the credibility of his threats of termination.Research limitations/implicationsThe study outlines an avenue for further research on the termination dynamics of mediation.Practical implicationsUnderstanding the conditions for successfully using the exit‐option is vital for policy‐makers, in particular for peace diplomacy efforts in other contexts than the Northern Ireland one.Originality/valueThe paper challenges previous explanations for why threats by mediators to call off further mediation attempts are successful and argues that a mediator can use the parties' informational dependency on him in order to increase his leverage and push the parties towards settlement.

scholarly journals Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly

2002 ◽  
Vol 106 (1) ◽  
pp. 151-160 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ezra Einy ◽  
Diego Moreno ◽  
Benyamin Shitovitz
Keyword(s):  
Cournot Oligopoly ◽  
Information Advantage

Research on X-Band Weather Radar Network Based on Sensor Grid

2012 ◽  
Vol 468-471 ◽  
pp. 1274-1277
Author(s):  
Chen Li
Keyword(s):  
Weather Radar ◽  
Key Technology ◽  
Radar Systems ◽  
Radar Network ◽  
Additional Equipment ◽  
X Band ◽  
Architectural Framework ◽  
Information Advantage ◽  
New Generation ◽  
Network Advantage

Monitoring of precipitation using X-band weather radar systems is becoming popular. X-band weather radar network, as an additional equipment of China new generation weather radar, primarily used to measure weather echo within 3km above the ground and has a high prospect. The network, based on sensor grid, is greater information advantage and network advantage. This paper describes the design, the key technology and implementation of an architectural framework of the weather radar network based on sensor grid. The results show that the network works robustly in real time.

Biased Boards

2018 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Baldenius ◽  
Xiaojing Meng ◽  
Lin Qiu
Keyword(s):  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Information Gathering ◽  
Corporate Board ◽  
Rent Extraction ◽  
Initial Information ◽  
Precise Information ◽  
Optimal Contracting ◽  
Information Advantage ◽  
Empirical Regularity

ABSTRACT We study a corporate board tasked with monitoring a firm's CEO and providing incrementally decision-relevant information. The board has both compensation and non-pecuniary incentives—we label the latter board bias. Friendly boards have muted information gathering incentives, but can more effectively engage in cheap talk communication with management. As a result, the direction of the optimal board bias is determined by the CEO's initial information advantage: the board should be weakly friendly if the CEO is endowed with precise information, and weakly antagonistic (to the CEO) otherwise. Aside from assembling a friendly board, another way for shareholders to foster CEO/board communication is by granting the CEO more equity. In general, we find board friendliness and CEO equity grants to be positively associated, in equilibrium. This provides an optimal contracting rationale for an empirical regularity often interpreted as friendly boards facilitating rent extraction.

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