'They Don't Let Us Speak': Gender Relations and Judicial Decision-Making in the Brazilian Supreme Court

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rafaela Carvalho
2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 422-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas R Gray

Abstract State supreme court justices are often the final arbiters of cases in their jurisdictions. Yet, in states that grant governors the power to selectively reappoint supreme court justices, justices’ independence is limited. These governors are able to monitor justices’ decisions and are empowered to remove justices whose jurisprudence conflicts with the governor’s preferences. This power gives governors substantial influence over judicial decision-making by justices eligible for another term on the bench. I test this proposition on an exhaustive set of state supreme court criminal appeals from 1995 to 2010, and show that votes by justices who need to be reappointed covary with executive preferences, and more than votes by justices ineligible for reappointment. These effects are stable across time within a justice’s term so long as the serving governor may one day be their reappointer. I also show that these shifting individual votes lead to changes in outcomes for defendants.


Amicus Curiae ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 2-15
Author(s):  
David M. Masuhara

In this article the Hon Mr Justice David M. Masuhara, Supreme Court of British Columbia, briefly explores views that would be supportive of AI in the adjudicative process and those that would not. The author starts with a brief description of judicial decision-making and AI and then identifies and discusses the views and then offers dome comments on what an AI adjudication system might look like. Index keywords: Artificial Intelligence, AI, Judicial procedure, Courts, Information technology


2002 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 261-274 ◽  
Author(s):  
Damon M. Cann

Many states select judges using competitive elections. Proponents of appointment plans contend that judicial candidates may be tempted to grant favors to lawyers who donate to their campaigns, thus compromising the independence of the judiciary. I contend that previous studies have failed to rigorously test the hypothesis that campaign contributions directly affect judicial decision-making. Using data from the 1998 term of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, I show that lawyers who make campaign contributions are no more likely to win cases than lawyers who do not. Furthermore, the data show that judges who are faced by lawyers who contributed large amounts to their campaigns are more likely to recuse themselves.


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