Optimal Capital Buffers of Sovereign Debt Management Offices

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Eisl ◽  
Christian Ochs ◽  
Stefan Pichler
2016 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 273-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florian Fastenrath ◽  
Michael Schwan ◽  
Christine Trampusch

Sound public debt-management policies during sovereign debt distress periods are key to efficiently resolving a debt crisis and regaining market access. In addition to understanding the causes, processes, and outcomes of sovereign debt restructurings, this article analyzes the role of the debt manager along with determinants and strategies to maintain/regain market access. The sovereign’s debt sustainability analysis and determination of loss of market access are two crucial elements in the IMF’s lending decisions to countries in debt distress. Various indicators used in assessing whether the sovereign can tap international capital on a sustained basis are discussed. When a sovereign debt restructuring needs to be undertaken, it is necessary to determine the financial terms of the debt operation. Some key principles in designing sovereign debt restructuring scenarios and ways in securing full-financing of the economic program and regaining market access are presented. We conclude by offering a few best practices on preventing and managing sovereign debt restructurings.


Author(s):  
Ilias Bantekas

States enjoy the right to unilaterally denounce sovereign debt that is odious, illegal and illegitimate under strict circumstances. This entitlement does not exist where the debt(s) was/were incurred lawfully. A particular form of denunciation is sovereign insolvency, whose unilateral manifestation, is treated in practice by similar principles and responses as those apply mutatis mutandis to other forms of debt management. This chapter identifies, in addition to insolvency, five forms of unilateral debt denunciation that arise from the limited practice of states, which are moreover consistent with general international law. These are: (a) repudiation or non-enforcement of arbitral awards on public policy grounds; (b) denunciation on grounds of executive necessity and/or the right to fiscal/tax sovereignty; (c) direct unilateral repudiation on the basis of reports by national debt audit committees; (d) repudiation of contracts when creditor/investor violates human rights and of unconscionable concession contracts; (e) re-negotiation of bilateral investment treaties and concessions.


Author(s):  
Rosa María Lastra ◽  
Vassilis Paliouras

Creditor responses to sovereign debt crises suggest that they view such crises as problems of debt management on the part of the countries facing debt repayment difficulties. Thus, for example, debt relief and restructuring mechanisms coordinated by the international financial institutions place emphasis on correcting perceived imprudent debt management through a series of economic adjustment measures. Little attention, if any, is paid to addressing the underlying causes of the debt crises. This chapter examines the various causes of sovereign debt crises and the role that debt management plays in their eruption or in addressing them in a sustainable manner.


1997 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-104
Author(s):  
Jef VAN GERWEN ◽  
Danny CASSIMON

Author(s):  

The October 2019 Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) identifies the current key vulnerabilities in the global financial system as the rise in corporate debt burdens, increasing holdings of riskier and more illiquid assets by institutional investors, and growing reliance on external borrowing by emerging and frontier market economies. The report proposes that policymakers mitigate these risks through stricter supervisory and macroprudential oversight of firms, strengthened oversight and disclosure for institutional investors, and the implementation of prudent sovereign debt management practices and frameworks for emerging and frontier market economies.


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