Do Directors Suffer External Consequences for Failing to Align Executive Pay Practices with Shareholder Preferences? Evidence from Say-on-Pay Votes

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Elizabeth Thompson ◽  
Kelly R. Brunarski ◽  
T. Colin Campbell ◽  
Yvette S. Harman
Keyword(s):  
Executive Pay ◽  
Say On Pay

scholarly journals Shareholder Voice on Executive Pay: A Decade of Dutch Say on Pay

2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christoph Van der Elst ◽  
Anne Lafarre
Keyword(s):  
Executive Pay ◽  
Say On Pay

Determinants of disclosures of alternative pay measures and their role in Say on Pay approval

2017 ◽  
Vol 43 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-280 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brandy Hadley
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Additional Mechanism ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Say On Pay ◽  
Key Characteristics ◽  
Percentile Ranking

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants of the increase in firms’ reporting of alternative pay measures in Pay for Performance disclosures and their role in subsequent Say on Pay approval. Design/methodology/approach This study explores the most common types of supplemental compensation disclosures used in Pay for Performance discussions using a hand-collected sample of S&P 500 proxy statements from 2012-2014. The sample compares key characteristics of firms reporting “pocketed” pay, “market-value” pay, and “peer comparison” percentile ranking pay compared to firms that do not use these alternatives. Findings Results suggest that firms use alternative pay measures in their Pay for Performance disclosures for different reasons. While “pocketed” pay reporters show characteristics of opportunistic disclosures and “peer comparison” reporters tend toward informative disclosure, there is often a significant positive impact of disclosing additional compensation information on Say on Pay approval when combating prior poor Say on Pay support. However, the effect seems most significant for peer comparisons, indicating the value of reporting comparative pay. Originality/value This study provides insights into the increasing use of alternative pay measures, and through these measures, identifies an additional mechanism of firms’ responses to Say on Pay votes. In addition, this study highlights the importance of standardized Pay for Performance disclosures to improve informativeness and comparability in financial reporting across firms. Finally, the study provides additional evidence of opportunistic disclosure by firms in order to preserve executive pay.

The Effects of Promotion Probability on Executive Pay

2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (6) ◽  
pp. 95-128
Author(s):  
Jae Yong Shin ◽  
Sun-Moon Jung ◽  
Sang Woo Ahn
Keyword(s):  
Executive Pay

Is Global “Say on Pay” Here to Stay?

CFA Magazine ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (6) ◽  
pp. 22-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Orsagh
Keyword(s):  
Say On Pay

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

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