Interregional Negotiations and Strategic Delegation Under Government Subsidy Schemes

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryusuke Shinohara
Keyword(s):  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Strategic Delegation

Government Subsidy Dependence and Stock Price Crash Risk

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaoxing Liu ◽  
Obaid Ur Rehman ◽  
Kai Wu ◽  
Ziyan Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Stock Price ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Government Subsidy

scholarly journals Association between participation in the government subsidy programme for domestic travel and symptoms indicative of COVID-19 infection in Japan: cross-sectional study

BMJ Open ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. e049069
Author(s):  
Atsushi Miyawaki ◽  
Takahiro Tabuchi ◽  
Yasutake Tomata ◽  
Yusuke Tsugawa
Keyword(s):  
Sore Throat ◽  
Fixed Effects ◽  
Cross Sectional Study ◽  
High Fever ◽  
Internet Survey ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Sampling Weights ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Taste Disorder ◽  
The Government

ObjectiveTo investigate the association between participation in government subsidies for domestic travel (subsidise up to 50% of all travel expenses) introduced nationally in Japan on 22 July 2020 and the incidence of symptoms indicative of COVID-19 infections.DesignCross-sectional analysis of nationally representative survey data.SettingInternet survey conducted between 25 August and 30 September 2020 in Japan. Sampling weights were used to calculate national estimates.Participants25 482 survey respondents (50.3% (12 809) women; mean (SD) age, 48.8 (17.4) years).Main outcome measuresIncidence rate of five symptoms indicative of the COVID-19 infection (high fever, sore throat, cough, headache, and smell and taste disorder) within the past month of the survey, after adjustment for characteristics of individuals and prefecture fixed effects (effectively comparing individuals living in the same prefecture).ResultsAt the time of the survey, 3289 (12.9%) participated in the subsidy programme. After adjusting for potential confounders, we found that participants in the subsidy programme exhibited higher incidence of high fever (adjusted rate, 4.7% for participants vs 3.7% for non-participants; adjusted OR (aOR) 1.83; 95% CI 1.34 to 2.48; p<0.001), sore throat (19.8% vs 11.3%; aOR 2.09; 95% CI 1.37 to 3.19; p=0.002), cough (19.0% vs 11.3%; aOR 1.96; 95% CI 1.26 to 3.01; p=0.008), headache (29.2% vs 25.5%; aOR 1.24; 95% CI 1.08 to 1.44; p=0.006) and smell and taste disorder (2.6% vs 1.8%; aOR 1.98; 95% CI 1.15 to 3.40; p=0.01) compared with non-participants. These findings remained qualitatively unaffected by additional adjustment for the use of 17 preventative measures (eg, social distancing, wearing masks and handwashing) and fear against the COVID-19 infection.ConclusionsThe participation of the government subsidy programme for domestic travel was associated with a higher probability of exhibiting symptoms indicative of the COVID-19 infection.

scholarly journals Efficiency Analysis of Government Subsidy and Performance Guarantee Policies in Relation to PPP Infrastructure Projects

2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Shi ◽  
Yujia He ◽  
Masamitsu Onishi ◽  
Kiyoshi Kobayashi
Keyword(s):  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Performance Guarantee ◽  
Infrastructure Projects ◽  
Special Purpose Vehicle ◽  
Performance Guarantees ◽  
Sustainable Operation ◽  
Integrated Policy ◽  
The Government ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Liquidity Shock

Sustainable operation of public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects that are characterized by considerable external benefits is of vital importance. However, a liquidity shock might trigger an inefficient liquidation of a project by the special purpose vehicle (SPV) and the bank, whose objectives are to maximize the profits generated by the project. This study argues that performance guarantee and subsidy policies implemented by the government play a role in encouraging socially efficient decision-making by the SPV and the bank to ensure the continuation of socially valuable projects. The results show that both government subsidy and performance guarantee policies are effective in avoiding the inefficient liquidation of PPP infrastructure projects when the external benefits are large and certain. However, a performance guarantee policy might lead to inefficient continuation when the external benefits of a project are uncertain. Finally, we discuss the possibility that an integrated policy combining performance guarantees and government subsidies improves the efficiency of a PPP infrastructure project.

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