Are Accounting Choices a Way to Meet or Beat Analyst Forecasts Alternative to Earnings Management? Evidence from the Adoption of IAS38 for Brand Measurement

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucia Pierini
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Analyst Forecasts ◽  
Accounting Choices ◽  
Brand Measurement

Accounting Discretion, Horizon Problem, and CEO Retirement Benefits

2009 ◽  
Vol 84 (5) ◽  
pp. 1553-1573 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Kalyta
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Discretionary Accruals ◽  
Pension Plans ◽  
Primary Data ◽  
Retirement Benefits ◽  
Horizon Problem ◽  
Accounting Choices ◽  
Fortune 1000 ◽  
The Impact

ABSTRACT: Empirical research on the impact of managerial retirement on discretionary accounting choices is inconclusive, with most studies finding no evidence of earnings management in the pre-retirement period. I argue that income-increasing accounting choices in final pre-retirement years are particularly appealing to managers whose pension depends on firm performance in these years. Using primary data on retired CEOs of Fortune 1000 firms, I investigate the impact of CEO pension plans on discretionary accruals. Consistent with the prediction, I find evidence of income-increasing earnings management in the pre-retirement period only when CEO pension is based on firm performance. I also report evidence of negative abnormal market reaction to CEO retirement in firms with performance-contingent CEO pensions.

scholarly journals Practice Of Accounting Conservatism In MBE Firms

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 1785 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sang Hyun Park ◽  
Jaywon Lee
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Credit Rating ◽  
Earnings Forecasts ◽  
Analyst Forecasts ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Cost Of Debt ◽  
Management Behavior ◽  
Conservative Accounting ◽  
Expectation Management

Managers sometimes manage earnings upward (i.e., engage in earnings management) or guide analyst forecasts downward (i.e., engage in expectation management) to meet or beat analysts earnings forecasts (MBE). Our results suggest that certain management behavior to achieve MBE is highly associated with firms level of accounting conservatism. In detail, we find that (1) the level of accounting conservatism decreases as firms achieve MBE in consecutive years, (2) engaging in earnings management to achieve MBE lowers firms level of conservatism, and (3) firms that achieve MBE in consecutive years (CMBE firms) whose credit rating had been elevated practice less conservative accounting implying that the MBE string itself might act as a substitute for conservative accounting in lowering firms cost of debt.

The Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management Constraint

2002 ◽  
Vol 77 (s-1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan Barton ◽  
Paul J. Simko
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Accounting Choices ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Asset Values ◽  
Net Assets ◽  
Negative Earnings

The balance sheet accumulates the effects of previous accounting choices, so the level of net assets partly reflects the extent of previous earnings management. We predict that managers' ability to optimistically bias earnings decreases with the extent to which the balance sheet overstates net assets relative to a neutral application of GAAP. To test this prediction, we examine the likelihood of reporting various earnings surprises for 3,649 firms during 1993–1999. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the likelihood of reporting larger positive or smaller negative earnings surprises decreases with our proxy for overstated net asset values.

The effects of a public indicator of accounting aggressiveness on managers’ financial reporting decisions

2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (8) ◽  
pp. 986-1007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erin L. Hamilton ◽  
Rina M. Hirsch ◽  
Jason T. Rasso ◽  
Uday S. Murthy
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Risk Scores ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Accounting Choices ◽  
Best Estimate ◽  
Reporting Decisions ◽  
Public Risk ◽  
Risk Metric

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how publicly available accounting risk metrics influence the aggressiveness of managers’ discretionary accounting decisions by making those decisions more transparent to the public. Design/methodology/approach The experiment used a 2 × 3 between-participants design, randomly assigning 122 financial reporting managers among conditions in which we manipulated whether the company was currently beating or missing analysts’ consensus earnings forecast and whether an accounting risk metric was indicative of low risk, high risk or a control. Participants chose whether to manage company earnings by deciding whether to report an amount of discretionary accruals that was consistent with the “best estimate” (i.e. no earnings management) or an amount above or below the best estimate. Findings Aggressive (income-increasing) earnings management is deterred when managers believe such behavior will cause their firm to be flagged as aggressive (i.e. high risk) by an accounting risk metric. Some managers attempt to “manage” the risk metric into an acceptable range through conservative (income-decreasing) earnings management. These results suggest that by making the aggressiveness of accounting choices more transparent, public risk metrics may reduce one type of earnings management (income-increasing), while simultaneously increasing another (income-decreasing). Research limitations/implications The operationalization of the manipulated variables of interest may limit the study’s generalizability. Practical implications Users of accounting risk metrics (e.g. investors, auditors, regulators) should be cautious when relying on such risk metrics that may be of limited reliability and usefulness due to managers’ incentives to manipulate their companies’ risk scores by being overly conservative in an effort to prevent being labeled “aggressive”. Originality/value By increasing the transparency of the aggressiveness of accounting choices, public risk metrics may reduce one type of earnings management (income-increasing), while simultaneously increasing another (income-decreasing).

scholarly journals Attention to dividends, inattention to earnings?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles G. Ham ◽  
Zachary R. Kaplan ◽  
Steven Utke
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Trading Volume ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Analyst Forecasts ◽  
Firm Valuation ◽  
Earnings Response Coefficients ◽  
Earnings Information ◽  
Earnings Response ◽  
Cash Reserves ◽  
Supply Information

AbstractWe examine whether dividends serve as substitutes or complements to accounting information in firm valuation. Consistent with dividends substituting for earnings information, we find that dividend paying firms have 11%–15% lower earnings response coefficients (ERCs) than non-payers. We find more substitution when the dividend provides a stronger signal of permanent earnings: when the firm is less likely to cut the dividend, when the firm is likely to fund the dividend out of earnings rather than cash reserves, or when the dividend is larger. We then show that dividend payers have lower absolute returns, less trading volume, and fewer analyst forecasts at the earnings announcement (EA), suggesting that dividend payers attract less attention to their less informative EAs. Finally, we show that the lower EA attention translates into less earnings management and fewer earnings-related disclosures for dividend payers relative to non-payers. Collectively, this evidence suggests that dividends supply information about permanent earnings and, although costly, could be an efficient way for some firms to satisfy investors’ demand for earnings information.

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