R&D Contracting and Appropriability: Evidence from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan P. L. Png ◽  
Xi Xiong
Keyword(s):  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
The U.S

scholarly journals Patents and Cumulative Innovation: Causal Evidence from the Courts *

2014 ◽  
Vol 130 (1) ◽  
pp. 317-369 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Galasso ◽  
Mark Schankerman
Keyword(s):  
Small Firms ◽  
Causal Effect ◽  
Random Allocation ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Patent Rights ◽  
Medical Instruments ◽  
Cumulative Innovation ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
The Impact ◽  
The U.S

Abstract Cumulative innovation is central to economic growth. Do patent rights facilitate or impede follow-on innovation? We study the causal effect of removing patent rights by court invalidation on subsequent research related to the focal patent, as measured by later citations. We exploit random allocation of judges at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to control for endogeneity of patent invalidation. Patent invalidation leads to a 50% increase in citations to the focal patent, on average, but the impact is heterogeneous and depends on characteristics of the bargaining environment. Patent rights block downstream innovation in computers, electronics, and medical instruments, but not in drugs, chemicals, or mechanical technologies. Moreover, the effect is entirely driven by invalidation of patents owned by large patentees that triggers more follow-on innovation by small firms.

The Seeds of Dispute: Vernon Hugh Bowman v. Monsanto Company et al.

2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 579-585
Author(s):  
Emanuela Gambini
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Case Note ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
Monsanto Company ◽  
The U.S

In May 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court decided in Vernon Hugh Bowman v. Monsanto Company et al. in favor of Monsanto Company, affirming the judgment of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and holding that patent exhaustion does not permit a farmer to reproduce patented seeds through planting and harvesting without the patent holder's permission.This case note gives a brief overview of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, in which the meaning and limits of the doctrine of patent exhaustion have been examined, and discusses its implications for farmers and seed companies.

Antitrust: U.S. Supreme Court Affirms FTC Jurisdiction but Vacates Scope of Analysis on CDA Policy

1999 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 197-198
Author(s):  
Joseph R. Zakhary
Keyword(s):  
Public Relations ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Trade Commission ◽  
Ninth Circuit ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
For Profit ◽  
Rule Of Reason ◽  
Antitrust Analysis ◽  
Business Financing ◽  
The U.S

In California Dental Association v. FTC, 119 S. Ct. 1604 (1999), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a nonprofit affiliation of dentists violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA), 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (1998), which prohibits unfair competition. The Court examined two issues: (1) the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) jurisdiction over the California Dental Association (CDA); and (2) the proper scope of antitrust analysis. The Court unanimously held that CDA was subject to FTC's jurisdiction, but split 5-4 in its finding that the district court's use of abbreviated rule-of-reason analysis was inappropriate.CDA is a voluntary, nonprofit association of local dental societies. It boasts approximately 19,000 members, who constitute roughly threequarters of the dentists practicing in California. Although a nonprofit, CDA includes for-profit subsidiaries that financially benefit CDA members. CDA gives its members access to insurance and business financing, and lobbies and litigates on their behalf. Members also benefit from CDA marketing and public relations campaigns.

Patent Conflicts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tejas N. Narechania
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Authority ◽  
Direct Action ◽  
Patent Policy ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Relative Preference ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
Indirect Action ◽  
Striking Effect

Patent policy is typically thought to be the product of the Patent and Trademark Office, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and, in some instances, the Supreme Court. This simple topography, however, understates the extent to which outsiders can shape the patent regime. Indeed, a variety of administrative actors influence patent policy through the exercise of their regulatory authority and administrative power. This Article offers a novel description of the ways in which nonpatent agencies intervene into patent policy. In particular, it examines agency responses to conflicts between patent and other regulatory aims, uncovering a relative preference for complacency (“inaction”) and resort to outside help (“indirect action”) over regulation (“direct action”). This dynamic has the striking effect of shifting authority from nonpatent agencies to patent policymakers, thereby supplanting some regulatory designs with the patent regime’s more general incentives. This Article thus offers agencies new options for facing patent conflict, including an oft-overlooked theory of regulatory authority for patent-related regulation. Such intervention and regulation by nonpatent agencies can give rise to a more efficient and context-sensitive regime that is better aligned with other regulatory goals.

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