Wealthy Elites' Policy Preferences and Economic Inequality: The Case of Technology Entrepreneurs

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Broockman ◽  
Greg Ferenstein ◽  
Neil A. Malhotra
Keyword(s):  
Economic Inequality ◽  
Policy Preferences

Conclusion

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan E. Leighley ◽  
Jonathan Nagler
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Social Issues ◽  
Economic Inequality ◽  
Empirical Finding ◽  
The State ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Fundamental Relationship

This chapter returns to broader questions of representation and inequality in U.S. presidential elections. The present analysis of turnout in U.S. presidential elections since 1972 proceeded against a backdrop of seismic changes in economic inequality, and with a particular interest in the income bias of voters. The importance of the substantial and sustained income bias documented is underscored by findings on the consistent differences in the policy preferences of voters and nonvoters. This is the study's most important empirical finding is that voters are significantly more conservative than nonvoters on redistributive issues, and they have been in every election since 1972. Voters may be more liberal than nonvoters on social issues, but on redistributive issues they are not. These redistributive issues define a fundamental relationship between citizens and the state in a modern industrialized democracy and are central to ongoing conflicts about the scope of government. It is on these issues that voters offer a biased view of the preferences of the electorate.

The Dialectics of Decentralization: Economic Reform and Regional Inequality in Yugoslavia

1975 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 309-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas R. Lang
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Economic Policy ◽  
Economic Reform ◽  
Economic Inequality ◽  
National Level ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Regional Inequality ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
Federal States ◽  
National Leaders

Economic reform in Communist states is usually evaluated in terms of a dichotomy between traditional “command” economies and systems in which production and investment decisions are “decentralized” in the hands of immediate producers. This distinction tends to be misleading, especially when applied to multinational and/or federal states. This is the case for two reasons. First, the concept of decentralization may be disaggregated into a number of political and economic policy packages whose goals are not necessarily compatible. Second, differences in policy preferences among sub-national leaders are resolved in favor of a particular set of alternatives by the form of decentralization chosen at the national level. In Yugoslavia, decentralist reforms have subordinated the goal of reducing interregional economic inequality to the goals of rapid and stable economic growth, despite the fact that both “decentralist” goals have been equally espoused by federal planners.

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