Do Foreign Investors Promote Stock Price Efficiency in Emerging Markets?

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xuan Vinh Vo
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Price Efficiency ◽  
Foreign Investors

scholarly journals Systematic illiquidity, characteristic illiquidity, and stock returns: Timeseries analysis

2022 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 72-80
Author(s):  
Soltane et al. ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Systematic Risk ◽  
Timeseries Analysis ◽  
The Relationship

The objective of this research is to investigate the relationship between illiquidity and stock prices on the Tunisian stock exchange. While previous researches tended to focus on one form of illiquidity to examine this relationship, our study unifies three forms of illiquidity at the same time. Indeed, we simultaneously consider illiquidity as systematic risk, as a characteristic of the market, and as a characteristic of the stock. The aggregate illiquidity of the market is the average of individual stock illiquidity. The illiquidity risk is the sensitivity of the stock price to illiquidity shocks. Shocks of market illiquidity are estimated by the innovations in the expected market illiquidity. Results show that investors on the Tunisian stock exchange do not require higher returns when they expect a rise of market illiquidity, whereas investors on U.S markets are compensated for higher expected market illiquidity. In addition, shocks of market illiquidity provoke a fall in stock prices of small caps, while large caps are not sensitive to market illiquidity shocks. This differs slightly from results based on U.S. data where illiquidity shocks reduce all stock prices but most notably those of small caps. Robustness tests validate our findings. Our results are consistent with previous studies which reported that the “zero-return” ratio predicts significantly the return-illiquidity relationship on emerging markets.

China's Closed Pyramidal Managerial Labor Market and the Stock Price Crash Risk

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 105-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donghua Chen ◽  
Jeong-Bon Kim ◽  
Oliver Zhen Li ◽  
Shangkun Liang
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Negative Association ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
The Political ◽  
Market Forces ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
Managerial Labor Market

ABSTRACT Managers of China's state-owned firms work in a closed pyramidal managerial labor market. They enjoy non-transferable benefits if they choose to stay within this system. The higher up are they in this labor market hierarchy (their political ranks), the fewer are their outside employment opportunities. Due to career and wealth concerns, they are cautious and risk-averse when managing firms. We examine the effect of managers' political ranks on firms' stock price crash risk and find a negative association. This association mainly exists in firms with younger managers and managers with shorter tenure. Further, this effect is only significant in regions with weak market forces, in firms without foreign investors, without political connections, and during periods with no local government leaders' or managers' political promotions. We conclude that the political ranking system reduces the stock price crash risk. JEL Classifications: G30; J33.

Foreign Investors, External Monitoring, and Stock Price Crash Risk

2019 ◽  
Vol 35 (4) ◽  
pp. 829-853
Author(s):  
Jeong-Bon Kim ◽  
Xiaoxi Li ◽  
Yan Luo ◽  
Kemin Wang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Accrual Quality ◽  
Foreign Investors ◽  
External Monitoring ◽  
Risk Reducing ◽  
Local Firms

We investigate whether foreign investors help to reduce local firms’ future stock price crash risk through their external monitoring. We find that the entrance of foreign investors is associated with a significant reduction in local firms’ future crash risk. Further investigation reveals that foreign investors help to improve local firms’ financial reporting quality from the perspectives of accrual quality, conservatism, and annual report tone management. The evidence is consistent with our conjecture that foreign investors play an important external monitoring role, which reduces managerial bad-news hoarding and thereby lowers local firms’ future crash risk. We also find that the crash risk–reducing role of foreign investors is more pronounced when foreign investors are more familiar with the institutional background of the host country, when they have stronger incentives to monitor local firms, and when local firms have higher governance efficacy. A variety of robustness checks reveals that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity.

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