scholarly journals ABBA: An Agent-Based Model of the Banking System

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Antonio Chan-Lau
2007 ◽  
Vol 11 (S1) ◽  
pp. 62-79 ◽  
Author(s):  
DOMENICO DELLI GATTI ◽  
CORRADO DI GUILMI ◽  
MAURO GALLEGATI ◽  
GIANFRANCO GIULIONI

In this paper we present and discuss a simple financial accelerator agent-based model, whose conceptual core is the interaction of heterogeneous firms and the banking system. Its simplicity notwithstanding, the model is able to replicate through simulations a large number of stylized facts concerning the shape and evolution over time of the distribution of firms' sizes, growth rates, profits, and “bad debt.”


2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrey Leonidov ◽  
◽  
Vladimir Nechitailo ◽  
Ekaterina Serebryannikova ◽  
◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Pei Mu ◽  
Tingqiang Chen ◽  
Kun Pan ◽  
Meng Liu

Credit risk contagion between banks and firms is one of the important triggers of financial crisis, and the credit linkage network is the way of systemic risk contagion triggered by external shocks. Considering the heterogeneity of behavioral rules, learning rules, and interaction rules, this paper constructs a bank-firm credit matching network model based on ABM (agent-based model) model and reinforcement learning algorithm to analyze the interaction behavior and credit risk network contagion mechanism. The results show that (1) macroeconomic cycles are the result of the interaction between banks and enterprises and the interaction of microentities under complex financial conditions; (2) enterprises are heterogeneous and the asset size follows a power-law distribution; (3) the greater the sensitivity of banks and enterprises to market performance, the lower the bank failure rate and enterprise default rate; and (4) shocks to the largest banks and enterprises in terms of assets and entry can all intensify the risk contagion between banks and enterprises. Therefore, the regulation of financial institutions that are “too big to fail” is not sufficient but should be a comprehensive regulation of the banking system.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (136) ◽  
pp. 1 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Chan-Lau ◽  

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