Do Activist Hedge Funds Target Female CEOs? The Role of CEO Gender in Hedge Fund Activism

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bill Francis ◽  
Yinjie(Victor) Shen ◽  
Qiang Wu
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Female Ceos ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
Ceo Gender

Hedge Fund Activism vs Other Activist Investors

2021 ◽  
pp. 252-282
Author(s):  
Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal ◽  
Jan Schnitzler
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Analysis ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Comparative Approach ◽  
Large Sample ◽  
Shareholder Proposals ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
The Impact

This chapter reviews the growing empirical literature on shareholder activism by hedge funds. The aim is a comparative approach contrasting the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms with outcomes for other types of activist investors. Following recent research, the chapter provides an empirical analysis based on the disclosure of equity blockholdings by activist investors in a large sample of all US listed companies. In addition, it summarizes which types of investors engage in other events linked to activism, such as takeovers, proxy contests, or shareholder proposals. Overall, there is evidence that not only hedge funds but also other types of investors can be effective monitors, but there are nuanced differences with respect to targeting decisions and payout policies.

Can Liquidity Risk Explain Diseconomies of Scale in Hedge Funds?

2017 ◽  
Vol 07 (02) ◽  
pp. 1750002
Author(s):  
Hany A. Shawky ◽  
Ying Wang
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Liquidity Risk ◽  
Fund Performance ◽  
Diseconomies Of Scale ◽  
Liquidity Crises ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Asset Size ◽  
Hedge Fund Performance

Using data from the Lipper TASS hedge fund database over the period 1994–2012, we examine the role of liquidity risk in explaining the relation between asset size and hedge fund performance. While a significant negative size-performance relation exists for all hedge funds, once we stratify our sample by liquidity risk, we find that such a relationship only exists among funds with the highest liquidity risk. Liquidity risk is found to be another important source of diseconomies of scale in the hedge fund industry. Evidently, for high liquidity risk funds, large funds are less able to recover from the relatively more significant losses incurred during market-wide liquidity crises, resulting in lower performance for large funds relative to small funds.

Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate M&A Decisions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Szu-Yin (Jennifer) Wu ◽  
Kee H. Chung
Keyword(s):  
Mergers And Acquisitions ◽  
Selection Bias ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Corporate Control ◽  
Market For Corporate Control ◽  
Target Firms ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism

This paper shows that hedge fund activism is associated with a decrease in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and offer premiums and an increase in stock and operating performance. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A performance by reducing poor M&A, diversifying M&A, and the M&A of firms with multiple business segments. Activist hedge funds improve target firms’ M&A decisions by influencing their governance practices. We show that our results are unlikely driven by selection bias. Overall, activist hedge funds play an important role in the market for corporate control by increasing the efficiency of target firms’ M&A activities through interventions. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance.

The Evolution in the U.S. of Private Enforcement via Litigation and Monitoring Techniques

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
James D. Cox ◽  
Randall S. Thomas
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
The United States ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Shareholder Litigation ◽  
Corporate Governance System

This chapter examines the evolution of private enforcement in the United States and the lessons that can be learned by German public companies from the experiences of their US counterparts. It first looks at the place of representative shareholder litigation within the US corporate governance system before turning to the broad-based criticisms against all forms of representative shareholder litigation on the grounds of excessive litigation agency costs. It then discusses the role of shareholder derivative suits in remedying breaches of duty of loyalty, along with the use of hedge funds in shareholder monitoring. It explores the increasing role of appraisal remedy against the backdrop of developments in shareholder litigation focused on acquisitions, and highlights the limitations of hedge fund activism. Finally, it assesses the implications of shareholder monitoring mechanisms in the United States for shareholders in Germany.

The Role of Activist Hedge Funds in Financially Distressed Firms

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (6) ◽  
pp. 1321-1351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jongha Lim
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Distressed Firms ◽  
Financially Distressed

AbstractIn this paper I investigate the role of activist hedge funds in the restructuring of a sample of 469 firms that attempted to resolve distress either out of court, in conventional Chapter 11, or via prepackaged restructuring. Activist hedge funds strategically gain a position of influence in the restructuring of economically viable firms with contracting problems that prevent efficient restructuring without outside intervention. I find that hedge fund involvement is associated with a higher probability of completing prepackaged restructurings, faster restructurings, and greater debt reduction. Overall, the evidence in this article suggests that activist hedge funds can create value by enabling more efficient contracting.

Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Innovation

2021 ◽  
pp. 380-390
Author(s):  
Roberto S. Santos ◽  
Sunny Li Sun
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Innovation Performance ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Term Survival ◽  
Long Term Survival ◽  
Corporate Innovation ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism

While the jury is out on whether hedge fund activism encourages corporate innovation, there is mounting evidence to suggest that this is the case. A firm’s ability to innovate is crucial for its long-term survival. Through multiple mechanisms, activist hedge fund interventions can “shake things up” and stir corporations out of their myopic innovation investments. By bringing an end to the squandering of precious R&D resources, hedge fund activism stimulates and reshapes corporate competitiveness and enhances innovation performance. This chapter explores the strategies and mechanisms that activist hedge funds employ to influence corporate innovation and also offers avenues for future research.

The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Optimal Taxation ◽  
Private Equity ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Global Perspective ◽  
Fund Flows ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
The Us ◽  
Hedge Fund Activism ◽  
The Impact

The Oxford Handbook of Hedge Funds provides a comprehensive look at the hedge fund industry from a global perspective. The chapters are organized into five main parts. After the introductory chapter in Part I, Part II begins in Chapter 2 with an analysis of the main factors that have affected the operation of hedge funds. Chapter 3 explains the concept of hedge fund flows. Chapter 4 examines hedge fund manager fees and contracts. Part III focuses on different types of hedge fund strategies. The broad array of strategies are summarized in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 empirically examines the performance of hedge fund strategies. Chapter 7 compares the strategies of hedge funds to private equity funds. Chapter 8 examines hedge fund herding. Chapter 9 examines hedge fund commodity trading advisors and leverage. Chapter 10 examines financial technology in hedge fund strategies. In Part IV, hedge fund activism in the US is examined in Chapter 11. The US and international literature on hedge fund activism is reviewed in different perspectives in Chapters 12 and 13. Case studies are provided in Chapter 14. The impact of activism on large company innovation is discussed in Chapter 15. In Part V, Chapter 16 examines whether hedge funds may engage in misreporting and fraud. Chapter 17 reviews work on hedge fund misconduct and detection. Chapter 18 discusses compliance among hedge funds. Chapter 19 examines theoretical approaches to hedge fund regulation. Chapter 20 examines optimal taxation. Chapter 21 examines hedge funds from a political economy context.

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