Compensation for Managers with Career Concerns: The Role of Stock Option in Optimal Contracts

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Nohel ◽  
Steven K. Todd
Keyword(s):  
Stock Option ◽  
Career Concerns ◽  
Optimal Contracts

The Role of Managerial Stock Option Programs in Governance: Evidence from REIT Stock Repurchases

2010 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chinmoy Ghosh ◽  
Erasmo Giambona ◽  
John P. Harding ◽  
Özcan Sezer ◽  
C.F. Sirmans
Keyword(s):  
Stock Option ◽  
Stock Repurchases

scholarly journals Contracting with Heterogeneous Externalities

2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 50-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shai Bernstein ◽  
Eyal Winter
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Contracts ◽  
Simple Measure ◽  
Optimal Contracting ◽  
Optimal Ranking

We model situations in which a principal offers contracts to a group of agents to participate in a project. Agents' benefits from participation depend on the identity of other participating agents. We assume heterogeneous externalities and characterize the optimal contracting scheme. We show that the optimal contracts' payoff relies on a ranking, which arise from a tournament among the agents. The optimal ranking cannot be achieved by a simple measure of popularity. Using the structure of the optimal contracts, we derive results on the principal's revenue extraction and the role of the level of externalities' asymmetry. (JEL D62, D82, D86)

scholarly journals The Role of Employee Stock Option Plan to Reduce Earnings Management Actions

2017 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Namla Elfa Syariati ◽  
Bambang Subroto ◽  
Wuryan Andayani
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Employee Stock Option ◽  
Management Actions

scholarly journals The Role of Accounting in the Design of CEO Equity Compensation

2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
pp. 327-357 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mary Ellen Carter ◽  
Luann J. Lynch ◽  
I˙rem Tuna
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Total Compensation ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Restricted Stock ◽  
Compensation Design

We examine the role of accounting in CEO equity compensation design. For a sample of ExecuComp firms in 1995–2001, we find that financial reporting concerns are positively related to stock option use and total compensation, and negatively related to the use of restricted stock. We confirm our findings by examining changes in CEO compensation in firms that begin expensing options in 2002 or 2003. We find that these firms reduce their option use and increase their restricted stock use after starting to expense options but exhibit no decrease in total compensation. Taken together, our analyses suggest that favorable accounting treatment for options led to a higher use of options and lower use of restricted stock than would have been the case absent accounting considerations.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document