scholarly journals Demand Uncertainty, Product Differentiation, and Entry Timing Under Spatial Competition

Author(s):  
Takeshi Ebina ◽  
Noriaki Matsushima ◽  
Katsumasa Nishide
2001 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 73-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack G.A.J. van der Vorst ◽  
Stephan J. van Dijk ◽  
Adrie J.M. Beulens

The concepts of hybrid supply chain strategies and the decoupling point are applied to a poultry supply chain experiencing high demand uncertainty in an inflexible production environment. Several solutions are proposed for this supply chain to cope with high demand uncertainty. The customer order decoupling point, the product differentiation point and the information decoupling point play a central role in these solutions. Because of specific characteristics of the poultry supply chain, the opportunities for a leagile supply chain design are limited.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Bilal Ahmadi ◽  
Dhany Surya Ratana

This study analyzed the impact of component commonality to schedule instability. Analysis was implemented in the use of component commonality (use of same component in different product structures) in a simple supply chain system which is consist of one manufacturer and two suppliers. Different operational conditions were introduced such as: demand uncertainty, product cost structure, product lead time, product structure and inventory policy that company utilized. The simulation results suggested that common component could reduce schedule instability in both manufacturer and suppliers. Furthermore, the results also indicated that suppliers were the more affected entities due to uncertainty rather than manufacturer


Author(s):  
Xingtang Wang ◽  
Jie Li ◽  
Leonard F.S. Wang

AbstractThis paper explores the impact of intensity of rivalry in downstream market on the equilibrium locations of the downstream firms under a vertical market structure á la Hotelling. We find that: (i) the presence of upstream firms softens the spatial competition in downstream market; (ii) minimum differentiation cannot be achieved as the equilibrium outcome and the equilibrium product differentiation is insufficient relative to socially optimum; (iii) social welfare is higher with a higher weight attached to intensity of rivalry, which is different from the non-monotonic relationship under the horizontal market case; (iv) the equilibrium product differentiation is independent of bargaining power under the two-part tariff contracts, which is different from Brekke and Straume (2004) under linear pricing.


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