Do Executive Compensation Contracts Maximize Firm Value? Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Menachem (Meni) Abudy ◽  
Dan Amiram ◽  
Oded Rozenbaum ◽  
Efrat Shust
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Compensation Contracts

Do executive compensation contracts maximize firm value? Indications from a quasi-natural experiment

2020 ◽  
Vol 114 ◽  
pp. 105787 ◽  
Author(s):  
Menachem (Meni) Abudy ◽  
Dan Amiram ◽  
Oded Rozenbaum ◽  
Efrat Shust
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Compensation Contracts

scholarly journals Board independence and firm value: A quasi-natural experiment using Taiwanese data

2020 ◽  
Vol 57 ◽  
pp. 71-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaoyao Fan ◽  
Yuxiang Jiang ◽  
Mao-Feng Kao ◽  
Frank Hong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Board Independence

The role of accounting conservatism in executive compensation contracts

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 1139-1163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takuya Iwasaki ◽  
Shota Otomasa ◽  
Atsushi Shiiba ◽  
Akinobu Shuto
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Compensation Contracts
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