Endogenous Protectionism and Tariffication: Implications of the Interest Group Size and Free-Rider Problem

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tai-Liang Chen ◽  
Yuxiang Zou
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem

Interest Groups and Get Out the Vote Drives

2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
John Cadigan
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Policy Outcomes ◽  
Candidate Model ◽  
Voter Mobilization ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Multiple Interest ◽  
Get Out The Vote

Abstract This article analyzes voter mobilization and interest group activity within a citizen-candidate model. Interest groups influence the decisions of 'high cost’ voters by running a 'get out the vote’ campaign. Membership fees paid by citizens joining an interest group finance the vote drives. Because citizens choose whether to join an interest group, size is an endogenous feature of equilibrium outcomes. In contrast to the existing literature, it is shown that smaller groups may have greater influence. Importantly, this result does not depend on the ability of smaller groups to overcome the free rider problem. Intuitively, because smaller groups may have a less diverse membership, they can advocate more extreme policy outcomes. An interest group’s influence is shown to depend on voting costs and the separation between candidate positions. The presence of multiple interest groups mitigates an interest’s influence, resulting in inefficiency.

scholarly journals Modes of Collective Action in Village Economies: Evidence from Natural and Artefactual Field Experiments in a Developing Country

2013 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yasuyuki Sawada ◽  
Ryuji Kasahara ◽  
Keitaro Aoyagi ◽  
Masahiro Shoji ◽  
Mika Ueyama
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Size Effect ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Field Experiments ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Individual Contribution ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Group Size Effect

In a canonical model of collective action, individual contribution to collective action is negatively correlated with group size. Yet, empirical evidence on the group size effect has been mixed, partly due to heterogeneities in group activities. In this paper, we first construct a simple model of collective action with the free rider problem, altruism, public goods, and positive externalities of social networks. We then empirically test the theoretical implications of the group size effect on individual contribution to four different types of collective action, i.e., monetary or nonmonetary contribution to directly or indirectly productive activities. To achieve this, we collect and employ artefactual field experimental data such as public goods and dictator games conducted in southern Sri Lanka under a natural experimental situation where the majority of farmers were relocated to randomly selected communities based on the government lottery. This unique situation enables us to identify the causal effects of community size on collective action. We find that the levels of collective action can be explained by the social preferences of farmers. We also show evidence of free riding by self-interested households with no landholdings. The pattern of collective action, however, differs significantly by mode of activity—collective action that is directly rather than indirectly related to production is less likely to suffer from the free rider problem. Also, monetary contribution is less likely to cause free riding than nonmonetary labor contribution. Unlike labor contributions, monetary contributions involve collection of fees which can be easily tracked and verified, possibly leading to better enforcement of collective action.

Altruism, the free rider problem and group size

1974 ◽  
Vol 4 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 259-275 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Sweeney
Keyword(s):  
Group Size ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem

How do Optimistic Individuals Affect Insurance Advertisements?

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yoichiro Fujii ◽  
Michiko Ogaku ◽  
Mahito Okura ◽  
Yusuke Osaki
Keyword(s):  
Maximum Level ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
Insurance Premium ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Accident Probability ◽  
Insurance Firms ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Accident Probabilities ◽  
Equilibrium Number

AbstractSome people have optimistic expectations regarding their accident probability, and thus, refrain from purchasing adequate insurance. This study investigates how insurance firms use advertisements to lower the ratio of optimistic individuals in the market. The main results are as follows: first, the optimal level of advertisements is maximized when the insurance premium is moderate. Second, the maximum level of advertisement varies according to the degree of optimism, which is measured by the difference between accurate and optimistic accident probabilities. Third, the advertisement decision is affected by the free-rider problem, and the equilibrium number of insurance firms with advertisement is always larger than that of firms without advertisement in a competitive insurance market.

The Free-Rider Problem: A Survey

1979 ◽  
Vol 55 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
JOHN McMILLAN
Keyword(s):  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem

The Battle over Patents

2021 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Division Of Labor ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Property Right ◽  
Economic Surplus ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
The Past ◽  
Inventive Activity ◽  
Patent Systems

Do patents facilitate or frustrate innovation? Lawyers, economists, and politicians who have staked out strong positions in this debate often attempt to validate their claims by invoking the historical record—but they typically get the history wrong. The purpose of this book is to get the history right by showing that patent systems are the product of contending interests at different points in production chains battling over economic surplus. The larger the potential surplus, the more extreme are the efforts of contending parties, now and in the past, to search out, generate, and exploit any and all sources of friction. Patent systems, as human creations, are therefore necessarily ridden with imperfections; nirvana is not on the menu. The most interesting intellectual issue is not how patent systems are imperfect, but why historically US-style patent systems have come to dominate all other methods of encouraging inventive activity. The answer offered by the essays in this volume is that they create a temporary property right that can be traded in a market, thereby facilitating a productive division of labor and making it possible for firms to transfer technological knowledge to one another by overcoming the free-rider problem. Precisely because the value of a patent does not inhere in the award itself but rather in the market value of the resulting property right, patent systems foster a decentralized ecology of inventors and firms that ceaselessly extends the frontiers of what is economically possible.

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