Investor Access to Conference Call Disclosures: Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Information Asymmetry

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shyam V. Sunder
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Conference Call ◽  
Fair Disclosure

scholarly journals Disclosure Frequency, Information Environment, and Cost of Capital under Regulation Fair Disclosure in the Korean Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (14) ◽  
pp. 5856
Author(s):  
Hoshik Shim
Keyword(s):  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Information Leakage ◽  
Equity Capital ◽  
Information Environment ◽  
Price Ratio ◽  
Corporate Disclosure ◽  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Fair Disclosure ◽  
Korean Market

Disclosure policy contributes to improve sustainable corporate information environment by mitigating information asymmetry surrounding companies. Economic theories generally support that more disclosures reduce the level of information asymmetry, increase stock liquidity, and thus decrease the costs of equity capital. However, the effect of corporate disclosure in emerging markets is not clearly predictable because of the potential information leakage prior to disclosure. Considering this issue, this study focuses on the Regulation Fair Disclosure which prohibits selective disclosure. Using the earnings-to-price ratio as a proxy of the costs of equity, the study finds that disclosure frequency is negatively related to the cost of equity capital. However, I do not find evidence that disclosure is negatively related to the implied costs of equity capital (ICOE). The results of the quintile analysis suggest that this inconsistency is attributable to the better information environment of the ICOE sample. The findings of this study have implications for disclosure regulations in emerging markets, given that the existing literature casts doubt on the effectiveness of corporate disclosure in such markets.

The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure: Trading Costs and Information Asymmetry

2004 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-225 ◽  
Author(s):  
Venkat R. Eleswarapu ◽  
Rex Thompson ◽  
Kumar Venkataraman
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Securities And Exchange Commission ◽  
Return Volatility ◽  
Trading Costs ◽  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Fair Disclosure ◽  
Regulation Fd ◽  
Material Information ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selective Disclosure

AbstractIn October 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) passed Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in an effort to reduce selective disclosure of material information by firms to analysts and other investment professionals. We find that the information asymmetry reflected in trading costs at earnings announcements has declined after Regulation FD, with the decrease more pronounced for smaller and less liquid stocks. Return volatility around mandatory announcements is also lower but overall information flow is unchanged when mandatory and voluntary announcements are combined. Thus, the SEC appears to have diminished the advantage of informed investors, without increasing volatility.

Information Asymmetry and the Bond Coupon Choice

2017 ◽  
Vol 93 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Amiram ◽  
Alon Kalay ◽  
Avner Kalay ◽  
N. Bugra Ozel
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Signaling Mechanism ◽  
Exogenous Shock ◽  
Analyst Coverage ◽  
Fair Disclosure ◽  
Efficient Contract ◽  
Prior Literature

ABSTRACT We examine the role of the coupon choice in bond contracts as a signaling mechanism in the presence of information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders about the credit quality of the borrower. Prior literature focuses on the use of maturity as a signaling mechanism. We conjecture that the coupon is a more effective signaling mechanism. We exploit the enactment of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RegFD) as an exogenous shock to the level of information asymmetry, and employ both bond- and equity market-based variables of information asymmetry to test our conjecture. We find that following the enactment of RegFD, the coupon rates of bonds issued by unrated firms increase relatively more than those of rated firms, consistent with the coupon choice addressing information asymmetry. We fail to find similar increases in maturity. Our inferences remain the same when using the probability of informed trade to measure relative changes in information asymmetry around the enactment of RegFD. We also draw similar conclusions utilizing exogenous drops in analyst coverage that result from brokerage house closures as an alternative quasi-natural experiment. Finally, we provide evidence that the coupon is used more extensively when issuance costs are higher, precisely when maturity is predicted to be a less efficient contract term with which to address information asymmetry. JEL Classifications: G10; G23; M21; M41.

scholarly journals The Impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Information Asymmetry and Trading: An Intraday Analysis

2004 ◽  
Vol 39 (4) ◽  
pp. 549-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiraphol N. Chiyachantana ◽  
Christine X. Jiang ◽  
Nareerat Taechapiroontong ◽  
Robert A. Wood
Keyword(s):  
Information Asymmetry ◽  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Fair Disclosure ◽  
Intraday Analysis ◽  
The Impact

The Influence of Regulation Fair Disclosure on Firm Financing Decisions

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan M. Albring ◽  
Monica L. Banyi ◽  
Dan S. Dhaliwal ◽  
Raynolde Pereira
Keyword(s):  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Financing Decisions ◽  
Fair Disclosure ◽  
Firm Financing

Regulation Fair Disclosure and Credit Market

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yutao Li ◽  
Anthony Saunders ◽  
Pei Shao
Keyword(s):  
Credit Market ◽  
Regulation Fair Disclosure ◽  
Fair Disclosure
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