Philip Morris USA: Life after the Master Settlement Agreement (a)

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marian Chapman Moore ◽  
Andrew C. Wicks ◽  
Elizabeth A. Powell ◽  
Brooke Correll
Keyword(s):  
Philip Morris ◽  
Settlement Agreement

Stakeholder Engagement Strategies After an Exogenous Shock: How Philip Morris and R. J. Reynolds Adapted Differently to the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement

2019 ◽  
pp. 000765031987081
Author(s):  
Jennifer J. Griffin ◽  
Yoo Na Youm ◽  
Ben Vivari
Keyword(s):  
Value Chain ◽  
Stakeholder Engagement ◽  
Exogenous Shock ◽  
Stakeholder Relationships ◽  
Engagement Strategies ◽  
Philip Morris ◽  
Settlement Agreement ◽  
Growth Prospects ◽  
Attorneys General ◽  
Big Four

This study contributes to understanding stakeholder engagement strategies by examining competitive responses alongside sociopolitical implications after a major exogenous shock—the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) between the “Big Four” U.S. tobacco firms and 46 state attorneys general. We compare the different stakeholder engagement strategies of the two remaining U.S. tobacco manufacturers, Philip Morris (PM) and R. J. Reynolds (RJR), between 1998 and 2017. Implications for stakeholder theory from a relatively rare natural experiment highlight the importance of simultaneously managing multiple stakeholders, inclusive of domestic and international sociopolitical and value chain stakeholders over time, for sustained value creation. Although PM and RJR initially pursued heterogeneous strategies by re-configuring relationships with relevant stakeholders, each firm’s growth prospects for the first decade post-MSA were exacerbated by various stakeholders through withholding and selective engagement strategies. Implications for how multiple, simultaneous stakeholder relationships can serve as important resources for achieving or limiting sustained growth are discussed.

scholarly journals Historia de las demandas y otras acciones legales entabladas contra la industria tabaquera en los Estados Unidos

2015 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
Goretti Vadillo Robredo
Keyword(s):  
Class Action ◽  
Philip Morris ◽  
Settlement Agreement ◽  
Attorneys General

I. Introducción. II. Demandas de particulares contra la industria tabaquera. 1. Introducción. 2. Antes de Cipollone. 3. Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc. a. En general. b. En concreto. 4. Después de Cipollone. 5. Fumadores pasivos. II. «Class Action» v. Tabacaleras. 1. Castano v. American Tobacco Co. 2. Broin v. Philip Morris. 3. Engle v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, et.al. III. Demandas entabladas por los estados (Attorneys General). IV. Acuerdos extrajudiciales. Comentario sobre el preacuerdo de junio de 1997. Preacuerdo de 23 de noviembre de 1998: Multistate Master Settlement Agreement (MSA). V. Recapitulación.

The Policy of the EEC on Concentrative Joint Ventures

1992 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-67
Author(s):  
D.S. Nava
Keyword(s):  
Structural Change ◽  
Joint Ventures ◽  
The Other ◽  
Legal Instrument ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Philip Morris ◽  
Competition Rules

The EEC Treaty contains no specific provisions for the control of concentrations. Only the competition rules. Articles 85 and 86 EEC, could be considered as possible legal instruments for regulating concentrations. The Commission has had to examine whether and to what extent these provisions could be used to this end.The Commission's view has been that Article 85 does not apply to operations resulting in structural change, as is the case of concentrations and concentrative joint ventures. Cooperative operations, such as cooperative joint ventures, on the other hand fall to be assessed under Article 85. The Philip Morris case has made this position uncertain. According to the extensive interpretation of this judgement Article 85 is now applicable to certain concentrations and thus to concentrative joint ventures.There is no such uncertainty regarding the role of Article 86 in controlling concentrative joint ventures, for the Court has established in the Continental Can case that concentrations can be caught by Article 86.With the adoption in 1989 of the Regulation on concentration control the Commission finally has a legal instrument specifically designed to regulate concentrations. However, only concentrations and concentrative joint ventures which comply with certain turnover thresholds (the so-called concentrations or concentrative joint ventures with a Community dimension) can be assessed by the Commission under the Regulation. This means that the provisions of the Regulation can not be applied to concentrative joint ventures beneath the threshold.Because of the difficulty in distinguishing concentrative operations from cooperative ones, the Commission published the Notice regarding the concentrative and cooperative operations under the Regulation on the control of concentrations.

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