A Very Easy Proof of Arrow's Impossibility Theorem Using Social Welfare Functionals

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Somdeb Lahiri
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Arrow’S Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Easy Proof ◽  
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Assessment criteria for aggregate social welfare

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (12) ◽  
pp. 2358-2371
Author(s):  
S.A. Moskal'onov
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Mathematical Analysis ◽  
Exchange Economy ◽  
Assessment Criteria ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
New Approaches ◽  
History Of Development ◽  
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem ◽  
History Of

Subject. The article addresses the history of development and provides the criticism of existing criteria for aggregate social welfare (on the simple exchange economy (the Edgeworth box) case). Objectives. The purpose is to develop a unique classification of criteria to assess the aggregate social welfare. Methods. The study draws on methods of logical and mathematical analysis. Results. The paper considers strong, strict and weak versions of the Pareto, Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky, and Samuelson criteria, introduces the notion of equivalence and constructs orderings by Pareto, Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky, and Samuelson. The Pareto and Samuelson's criteria are transitive, however, not complete. The Kaldor, Hicks, Scitovsky citeria are not transitive in the general case. Conclusions. The lack of an ideal social welfare criterion is the consequence of the Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, and of the group of impossibility theorems in economics. It is necessary to develop new approaches to the assessment of aggregate welfare.

ARROW-TYPE RESULTS UNDER INTUITIONISTIC FUZZY PREFERENCES

2013 ◽  
Vol 09 (01) ◽  
pp. 97-123 ◽  
Author(s):  
GILBERT NJANPONG NANA ◽  
LOUIS AIME FONO
Keyword(s):  
Positive Result ◽  
Social Preferences ◽  
Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Arrow’S Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Intuitionistic Fuzzy ◽  
Fuzzy Preferences ◽  
Arrow's Impossibility Theorem ◽  
Fuzzy Preference

Fono et al.11 characterized, for an intuitionistic fuzzy t-norm [Formula: see text], two properties of a given regular intuitionistic fuzzy strict component of a (T,S)-transitive intuitionistic fuzzy preference. In this paper, we examine these characterizations in the particular case where [Formula: see text]. We then use these (general and particular) results to obtain some intuitionistic fuzzy versions of Arrow's impossibility theorem. Therefore, by weakening a requirement to social preferences, we deduce a positive result, that is, we display an example of a non-dictatorial Intuitionistic Fuzzy Agregation Rule (IFAR) and, we establish an intuitionistic fuzzy version of Gibbard's oligarchy theorem.

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