Raising Rivals' Costs Through Cartel Detection - Why Downstream Buyers Rather Face an Upstream Cartel than Downstream Competition

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Clemens
Author(s):  
Argenton Cédric ◽  
Geradin Damien ◽  
Stephan Andreas

This chapter is concerned with cartel detection, through market monitoring, inspections, or well-designed leniency programs. It analyses three methods competition authorities regularly use to detect, and adduce evidence about, cartels. First, competition authorities can detect cartels by monitoring and screening markets. Second, competition authorities can conduct inspections at the business premises or private homes of cartel participants. Third, given the limitations of the first two methods, competition authorities can incentivize companies to report the cartels in which they may be involved by rewarding them for their cooperation. Pursuant to so-called leniency programmes, companies that choose to cooperate will, depending on the quality of the information provided and the time at which it is provided, benefit from full immunity from fines or significant fine reductions (partial immunity). Following in the footsteps of the US Department of Justice, the European Commission adopted a Leniency Notice in 1996, the application of which has allowed it to uncover a vast number of cartels.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 188-193
Author(s):  
Javier García-Verdugo ◽  
Carlos Merino Troncoso ◽  
Ane M Martin
Keyword(s):  

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean-Etienne de Bettignies ◽  
Bulat Gainullin ◽  
Hua Fang Liu ◽  
David Robinson

2017 ◽  
Vol 261 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-107 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qiankai Qing ◽  
Tianhu Deng ◽  
Hongwei Wang

2008 ◽  
Vol 118 (531) ◽  
pp. 1196-1222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chiara Fumagalli ◽  
Massimo Motta

Author(s):  
Kai Hüschelrath ◽  
Tobias Veith
Keyword(s):  

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