Discretionary Disclosure and Manager Horizon

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Glaeser ◽  
Jeremy Michels ◽  
Robert E. Verrecchia
Keyword(s):  
Discretionary Disclosure

Discretionary Disclosure on Twitter

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Crowley ◽  
Wenli Huang ◽  
Hai Lu
Keyword(s):  
Discretionary Disclosure

To Reveal or Not to Reveal? The Influence of Cultural Secrecy on Discretionary Disclosure Decisions

2020 ◽  
Vol 55 (03) ◽  
pp. 2050012
Author(s):  
Max Göttsche ◽  
Stephan Küster ◽  
Tobias Steindl
Keyword(s):  
Capital Market ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Cultural Influence ◽  
Managerial Incentives ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Disclosure Decisions ◽  
Discretionary Disclosure ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Capital Market

Prior studies on the relationship between culture and discretionary disclosure fail to account for concurrent managerial incentives to reveal private information to the capital market. Our study extends the literature by investigating whether these managerial incentives offset the cultural influence on managers’ discretionary disclosure decisions. To this end, we exploit a setting in which managers have the discretion to influence both the quantity and quality of disclosure and can thereby either conceal or reveal private information. For a sample of European firms, we find that despite incentives to reveal private information, managers’ culturally determined preference for secrecy leads them to provide a low quantity as well as a lower quality of disclosure. Our results are robust to several sensitivity checks and demonstrate the relative importance of cultural influence on discretionary disclosure decisions.

Discretionary disclosure and manager horizon: evidence from patenting

2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 597-635 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Glaeser ◽  
Jeremy Michels ◽  
Robert E. Verrecchia
Keyword(s):  
Discretionary Disclosure

scholarly journals Discretionary Disclosure in Financial Reporting: An Examination Comparing Internal Firm Data to Externally Reported Segment Data

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 417-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel A. Bens ◽  
Philip G. Berger ◽  
Steven J. Monahan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Census Bureau ◽  
Proprietary Costs ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Discretionary Disclosure ◽  
External Reporting ◽  
Firm Data ◽  
Plant Level ◽  
Segment Data

ABSTRACT: We use confidential, U.S. Census Bureau, plant-level data to investigate aggregation in external reporting. We compare firms’ plant-level data to their published segment reports by grouping a firm’s plants that share the same four-digit SIC code into a “pseudo-segment.” We then determine whether each pseudo-segment is disclosed as an external segment, or whether it is subsumed into a different business unit for external reporting purposes. We show that a pseudo-segment is more likely to be aggregated when the agency and proprietary costs of separately reporting the pseudo-segment are higher and when firm and pseudo-segment characteristics allow for more discretion in the application of segment reporting rules. For firms reporting multiple external segments, aggregation of pseudo-segments is driven by both agency and proprietary costs. For firms reporting a single external segment, we find no evidence of an agency cost motive for aggregation.

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