Systemic Risk Contribution from Financial Network in the UK

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ahmed Sakr
2015 ◽  
Vol 61 ◽  
pp. S36-S52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikos Paltalidis ◽  
Dimitrios Gounopoulos ◽  
Renatas Kizys ◽  
Yiannis Koutelidakis

Author(s):  
Benjamin Joanna

Two notable traumas followed the failure of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008. The first was the catastrophic delivering that affected wholesale financial institutions in 2009, as the post-LBIE markets went into free-fall. The second was the very long delays in the return of client assets held by in the UK Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE). The systemic failure has been associated with the reuse of securities collateral in general. Some have argued that the client asset delays were associated with a category of reuse, known as rehypothecation, in particular. Regulatory reforms have been introduced with a view to addressing both. However, this chapter argues that the true lesson of both failures is not yet fully reflected in regulation. This is the profound impact of shadow banking, and the reuse of securities collateral within it, upon client asset protection and systemic risk management alike.


Risks ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 54 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rüdiger Frey ◽  
Juraj Hledik

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Jianxu Liu ◽  
Yangnan Cheng ◽  
Yefan Zhou ◽  
Xiaoqing Li ◽  
Hongyu Kang ◽  
...  

This paper investigates the risk contribution of 29 industrial sectors to the China stock market by using one-factor with Durante generator copulas (FDG) and component expected shortfall (CES) analyses. Risk contagion between the systemically most important sector and other sectors is examined using a copula-based ∆CoVaR approach. The data cover the 2008 global financial crisis and the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. The empirical results show that the banking sector contributed most to systemic risk before and during the global financial crisis. Nonbank finance became equally important in 2020, and the COVID-19 pandemic promoted the position of the computer and pharmaceuticals sectors. The spillover effect diminishes over time, but there remains risk contagion between sectors. The risk spillover trend is consistent with that of systemic risk.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 6222
Author(s):  
Su ◽  
Huang ◽  
Drakeford

We utilized a high dimensional financial network to investigate the systemic risk contagion between different industries in China and to explore the impacts of monetary policy and industry heterogeneity factors. The empirical results suggest that the total level of systemic risk increased quite significantly during the 2008 global crisis and the 2015–2016 Stock Market Disaster. The energy, material, industrial, and financial sectors are the top systemic risk contributors. Industry heterogeneity variables such as the leverage ratio, book-to-market ratio, return on assets (ROA) and size have significant impacts on the systemic risk, but their effects on the systemic risk contribution are more pronounced than those on the systemic risk sensitivity. Moreover, monetary policy can effectively suppress the systemic risk diffusion derived from the leverage ratio. These results are essential for investors and regulators of risk management.


2019 ◽  
Vol 80 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-99 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Jaremski ◽  
David C. Wheelock

Financial network structure is an important determinant of systemic risk. This article examines how the U.S. interbank network evolved over a long and important period that included two key events: the founding of the Federal Reserve and the Great Depression. Banks established connections to correspondents that joined the Federal Reserve in cities with Fed offices, initially reducing overall network concentration. The network became even more focused on Fed cities during the Depression, as survival rates were higher for banks with more existing connections to Fed cities, and as survivors established new connections to those cities over time.


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