Institutional Shareholders' Split Personality on Corporate Governance: Active in Proxies, Passive in IPOs

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael D. Klausner
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Split Personality ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

scholarly journals The Effect of Multiple Large Shareholders on Banks’ Profitability and Risk

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1888
Author(s):  
Maria Gaia Soana ◽  
Laura Barbieri ◽  
Andrea Lippi ◽  
Simone Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Bank Ownership ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

The wide-ranging academic literature on corporate governance in the banking sector includes only a few studies on bank ownership and, specifically, on the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate structure. This paper reports an investigation into the presence of multiple large shareholders and their influence on profitability and risk in the long-term, considering a sample of 697 U.S. and European listed commercial banks from 2008 to 2018. It was found that the number of large and institutional shareholders has a positive impact on profitability, but no effect on risk. However, long-term ownership by multiple large shareholders contributes to decreasing risk in banks.

Does corporate governance influence corporate risk-taking? Evidence from the Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS)

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 ◽  
pp. 105-112 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pornsit Jiraporn ◽  
Pattanaporn Chatjuthamard ◽  
Shenghui Tong ◽  
Young Sang Kim
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Institutional Shareholders ◽  
Corporate Risk

scholarly journals The Wealth Effects Of Managerial Turnover: Implications For The Spanish Corporate Governance System

2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (10) ◽  
Author(s):  
Carlos Fernandez Mendez
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Wealth Effects ◽  
Governance System ◽  
Managerial Turnover ◽  
Study Results ◽  
Managerial Succession ◽  
Corporate Governance System ◽  
Institutional Shareholders ◽  
Positive Effect

Managerial succession decisions constitute crucial events for the company, as they can generate important organizational changes that affect the shareholders wealth, and at the same time, entail important conflicts of interests between the managers and the shareholders. Our study of the market reactions to managerial turnover announcements in the Spanish market, reveal that these decisions have a positive effect on the shareholders wealth. These wealth effects are especially intense in the case of outsider successions and when the company preturnover performance has been poor. These findings suggest that managerial turnover is a restructuring decision that is most welcome under conditions of low performance. These results are reinforced by the existence of a negative relationship between the turnover wealth effects and the firm's preturnover performance. Our results also have implications regarding the effectiveness of the Spanish corporate governance system, suggesting that the Board's outsiders and the institutional shareholders play a major monitoring role in the managerial succession processes. The Board outsiders and the institutional shareholders influence the succession process protecting the shareholders interests against particular professional interests of the managers. We have also found evidences of the existence of entrenchment effects linked to managerial stock ownership. Finally, consistently with our event study results, we have found evidences of a positive effect of outside succession on the market's reaction to managerial turnover, in the case of a poor presuccession performance context. We have obtained no evidence about any effect from outside succession in good performing companies or inside succession in any company independently of its previous performance.

Shareholder Activism, Institutional Shareholders and Agency Problems in Malaysia

2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 30-36
Author(s):  
Maizatul Akmal Musa ◽  
Shahril Eashak Ismail
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Best Practice ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Corporate Sustainability ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Shareholder Activism ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Contributing Factors ◽  
Internal Governance ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

Objective - The aim of this paper is to study the effectiveness of institutional shareholder activism in controlling corporate behaviours in Malaysia. Methodology/Technique - this study is investigated by critical reviewing previously published articles. Findings - Earlier researchers have viewed poor corporate governance as one of the main contributing factors to a major corporate disaster. The best practice of corporate governance suggests that shareholders should actively be engaged and involved with the investee companies to provide check and balance to the governance mechanism. This is particularly crucial for companies with suspicions of poor internal governance. The engagements from shareholders, especially the institutional shareholders in critical areas will give impacts to the governance structures and practices of the companies involved. Institutional shareholders usually have the capability to perform interventions throughout the year, not only limited to annual general meetings. Novelty - This study proved that corporate governance provides a structure to facilitate performance and also to enhance corporate sustainability. Type of Paper - Conceptual Keywords: Shareholder activism; institutional shareholders; corporate governance; Emerging Market; Agency problems.

scholarly journals Institutional Ownership and Firm Performance under Stakeholder-Oriented Corporate Governance

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 1021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hideaki Sakawa ◽  
Naoki Watanabel
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanisms ◽  
Institutional Shareholders ◽  
Japanese Corporations ◽  
Oriented System

This study aimed to reveal the role of institutional investors with shareholder-oriented scopes in a stakeholder-oriented economy such as Japan. With financial globalization, the increasing number of institutional shareholders in Japanese corporations enables us to investigate whether their shareholder-oriented perspectives are conducive to taking on effective monitoring roles under stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. This study’s sample included large listed firms of the TOPIX 500 in Japan during 2010-2016. Using 2924 firm-year observations, the effect of institutional investors on firm performance was analyzed to test the role of institutional investors in stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. Our study showed that the monitoring role of institutional shareholders, or foreign shareholders, functions effectively in Japanese corporations. In addition, we showed that the monitoring roles of these are expected to strengthen firms through higher growth opportunities. These results implied that institutional shareholders contribute to enhancing sustainable firm performance and constructing sustainable corporate governance mechanisms in a stakeholder-oriented system.

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