scholarly journals Altruistic Norm Enforcement and Decision-Making Format in a Dilemma: Experimental Evidence

Author(s):  
Kenju Kamei
Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 50
Author(s):  
Georg Kanitsar

Peer punishment is widely lauded as a decentralized solution to the problem of social cooperation. However, experimental evidence of its effectiveness primarily stems from public good structures. This paper explores peer punishment in another structural setting: a system of generalized exchange. In a laboratory experiment, a repeated four-player prisoner’s dilemma is arranged either in a public good structure or in a circular network of generalized exchange. The experimental results demonstrate that the merits of peer punishment do not extend to generalized exchange. In the public good, peer punishment was primarily altruistic, was sensitive to costs, and promoted cooperation. In generalized exchange, peer punishment was also altruistic and relatively frequent, but did not increase cooperation. While the dense punishment network underlying the public good facilitates norm enforcement, generalized exchange decreases control over norm violators and reduces the capacity of peer punishment. I conclude that generalized exchange systems require stronger forms of punishment to sustain social cooperation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 104346312110336
Author(s):  
Lucie Vrbová ◽  
Kateřina Jiřinová ◽  
Karel Helman ◽  
Hana Lorencová

Informal reasoning fallacies belong to a persuasive tactic, leading to a conclusion that is not supported by premises but reached through emotions and/or misleading and incomplete information. Previous research focused on the ability to recognize informal reasoning fallacies. However, the recognition itself does not necessarily mean immunity to their influence on decisions made. An experiment was designed to study the relationship between the presence of informal reasoning fallacies and a consequent decision. Having conducted paired comparisons of distributions, we have found some support for the hypothesis that informal reasoning fallacies affect decision-making more substantially than non-fallacious reasoning—strong support in the case of a slippery slope, weak in that of appeal to fear, anecdotal evidence argument defying evaluation. Numeracy and cognitive reflection seem to be associated with higher resistance to the slippery slope, but do not diminish appeal to fear.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 80-90
Author(s):  
Jinhyung Kim ◽  
Andrew G. Christy ◽  
Grace N. Rivera ◽  
Joshua A. Hicks ◽  
Rebecca J. Schlegel

Many people endorse a “true-self-as-guide” (TSAG) lay theory of decision-making that suggests following one’s true self is an optimal strategy for making decisions. Across five studies ( N = 1,320), we test whether perceived use of the true self enhances decision satisfaction. Study 1 provides correlational evidence. Studies 2 and 3 provide experimental evidence that participants felt more satisfied with choices made under TSAG instructions, compared to alternate strategies. Critically, we argue that perceived use of the true self enhances decision satisfaction regardless of whether consulting the true self actually influences the decision made. Studies 4 and 5 find evidence in support of this perceptual mechanism. This research provides insight into one way by which people find satisfaction amid life’s uncertainty, extending existing research on the role of the concept of true selves in positive functioning.


2016 ◽  
Vol 113 (31) ◽  
pp. 8658-8663 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jillian J. Jordan ◽  
Moshe Hoffman ◽  
Martin A. Nowak ◽  
David G. Rand

Humans frequently cooperate without carefully weighing the costs and benefits. As a result, people may wind up cooperating when it is not worthwhile to do so. Why risk making costly mistakes? Here, we present experimental evidence that reputation concerns provide an answer: people cooperate in an uncalculating way to signal their trustworthiness to observers. We present two economic game experiments in which uncalculating versus calculating decision-making is operationalized by either a subject’s choice of whether to reveal the precise costs of cooperating (Exp. 1) or the time a subject spends considering these costs (Exp. 2). In both experiments, we find that participants are more likely to engage in uncalculating cooperation when their decision-making process is observable to others. Furthermore, we confirm that people who engage in uncalculating cooperation are perceived as, and actually are, more trustworthy than people who cooperate in a calculating way. Taken together, these data provide the first empirical evidence, to our knowledge, that uncalculating cooperation is used to signal trustworthiness, and is not merely an efficient decision-making strategy that reduces cognitive costs. Our results thus help to explain a range of puzzling behaviors, such as extreme altruism, the use of ethical principles, and romantic love.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document