Who's Afraid of Market Foreclosure? A Closer Look at Exclusivity Agreements

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ittai Paldor
Keyword(s):  
Market Foreclosure

scholarly journals Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure with Convex Downstream Costs

2002 ◽  
Vol 75 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pio Baake ◽  
Ulrich Kamecke ◽  
Hans-Theo Normann
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Market Foreclosure

The Motorization and Decline of Urban Public Transit, 1935–1950

1981 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-600 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. St. Clair
Keyword(s):  
Public Transit ◽  
Aggregate Data ◽  
Comparative Cost ◽  
Profit Analysis ◽  
Market Foreclosure

Were intracity motor buses economically inferior to electric streetcars and electric buses in the late 1930s and l940s? The contention that they were has recently served as the basis for allegations that the decline of urban public transit was attributable, in large part, to an organized campaign intent on eliminating viable public transit. Aggregate data from trade sources allows a comparative cost and profit analysis of motor buses, electric buses, and electric streetcars for the years 1935–1950. The analysis supports the contention that motor buses were inferior. Questions regarding the applicability of criticisms of market foreclosure theory are also considered.

Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry

2001 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 428-453 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tasneem Chipty
Keyword(s):  
Vertical Integration ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Cable Television ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Distribution Networks ◽  
Cable System ◽  
Television Industry ◽  
Cable Television Industry ◽  
Market Foreclosure ◽  
Gain Access

I examine the effects of vertical integration between programming and distribution in the cable television industry. I assess the effects of ownership structure on program offerings, prices, and subscriptions, and I compare consumer welfare across integrated and unintegrated markets. The results of this analysis suggest two general conclusions. First, integrated operators tend to exclude rival program services, suggesting that certain program services cannot gain access to the distribution networks of vertically integrated cable system operators. Second, vertical integration does not harm, and may actually benefit, consumers because of the associated efficiency gains. (JEL L10, L22, L40)

scholarly journals Exclusivity Contracts, Insurance and Financial Market Foreclosure

2012 ◽  
Vol 60 (4) ◽  
pp. 609-630 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cédric Argenton ◽  
Bert Willems
Keyword(s):  
Financial Market ◽  
Market Foreclosure
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