Assessment: Russian Military Strategy, Operational Tactics and Objective in Syria

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumantra Maitra
Keyword(s):  
Military Strategy ◽  
Russian Military ◽  
Operational Tactics

scholarly journals Hostility, Chance, and Reason: Clausewitz and Russian Foreign Policy in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryan Thomas Jones
Keyword(s):  
Foreign Policy ◽  
Russian Federation ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Military Strategy ◽  
Russian Foreign Policy ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Russian Military ◽  
Strategic Thought

In 2008, the world stood in shock as Russian troops crossed over into the Republic of Georgia and seemingly annexed the sovereign lands of another nation. This five-day war directly resulted in varying levels of success and the achievement of political and military objectives for the Russian Federation. Several studies and analyses have sought to explain the actions of the Russian military and its leaders in an attempt to discern the primary influences on its current foreign policy and military strategy. However, these studies have devoted little attention towards arguably the most renowned and influential of all military theorists – Carl von Clausewitz. His tenets of philosophical and strategic thought, paired with his development of critical analysis towards the study of war, offer a remarkably relevant lens from which to view the 2008 war and more recent conflicts involving the Russian military. By utilizing Clausewitz’s own methodology of critical analysis in connection with an empirical case study on one of Russia’s recent military actions, this paper will attempt to establish an understanding of Russian foreign policy and military strategy. The research and analysis presented reveals that, contrary to modern arguments, the writings and principles of Carl von Clausewitz are anything but obsolete; when applied to the Russo-Georgian War, various principles of Clausewitzian thought aid in characterizing and explaining the actions and decisions of the armed forces and government of the Russian Federation.

scholarly journals Russian military hybrid operations in Ukraine: Adapting strategy and tactics to the contemporary structure of war

2019 ◽  
Vol 71 (4) ◽  
pp. 423-446
Author(s):  
Igor Pejic
Keyword(s):  
Soviet Union ◽  
Armed Forces ◽  
Global Scale ◽  
Military Strategy ◽  
Military Force ◽  
Next Generation ◽  
Hybrid Warfare ◽  
Modern Approach ◽  
Main Research ◽  
Russian Military

With the escalation of the Ukrainian crisis, more than a decade old term of hybrid warfare was brought back to life. The frequent usage of the term "hybrid warfare" on a global scale inconsequentially produced an alteration of the term's true meaning. In an attempt to define a hybrid war various aspects of power are being added, sometimes by mistake, which can be employed in a military manner. This paper will explore the concept of hybrid warfare in Ukraine on the premises of Russian military operations and their method of employing military force in the next generation of warfare. The main research subject represents the study of operational and tactical components of the military-political happenings on Crimea and in the region of Donbas, as well as the study of the modern approach in the deployment and utilization of military forces in the next generation of warfare. The altered visage of modern warfare, affected by various socio-economic and technological changes, also demands certain adjustments to military strategy and tactics in terms of force employment and how these efforts correlate with geopolitical goals and the manner in which they are accomplished. In the paper, the author will use a variety of primary and secondary sources in order to set a comprehensive theoretical foundation that will help us with the ongoing analysis of the Ukrainian war and the role of Russian armed forces in it. The goal of this study is to grasp and explain the changed concept of military force as well as to call attention to the dynamic nature of military strategy, which is constantly adjusting itself to the volatile character of war. The main findings of this paper are focused on a partial displacement of the Klauzewitzian centre of gravity, from higher strategic levels towards lower operational and tactical levels of military organization, as well as the fact that the Russian armed forces have managed to successfully reinvent itself after numerous political and economic hardships that have ensued after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

HISTORY OF MEDICINE DEVELOPMENT IN TURKISTAN

2020 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 63-67
Author(s):  
Mamarazok Tagaev ◽  
Keyword(s):  
History Of Medicine ◽  
Local Population ◽  
Russian Empire ◽  
Medicine Development ◽  
History Of ◽  
Russian Military ◽  
The Russian Empire

In the article, after the conquest of the Russian Empire in the province, hospitals were opened for the Russian military and turned them into a hospital. Opened hospitals in Tashkent, Samarkand and Kattakurgan and outpatients for women and men. However,the local population, fearing doctors in uniform, did not want to contact them and turned to healers and paramedics

Charlemagne’s Health in ‘Old Age’: Did It Affect Carolingian Military Strategy?

Mediaevistik ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-53
Author(s):  
Bernard S. Bachrach
Keyword(s):  
Old Age ◽  
The Political ◽  
Military Strategy ◽  
The West ◽  
Long Time

During the first thirty-three years of his reign as king of the Franks, i.e., prior to his coronation as emperor on Christmas day 800, Charlemagne, scholars generally agree, pursued a successful long-term offensive and expansionist strategy. This strategy was aimed at conquering large swaths of erstwhile imperial territory in the west and bringing under Carolingian rule a wide variety of peoples, who either themselves or their regional predecessors previously had not been subject to Frankish regnum.1 For a very long time, scholars took the position that Charlemagne continued to pursue this expansionist strategy throughout the imperial years, i.e., from his coronation on Christmas Day 800 until his final illness in later January 814. For example, Louis Halphen observed: “comme empereur, Charles poursuit, sans plus, l’oeuvre entamée avant l’an 800.”2 F. L. Ganshof, who also wrote several studies treating Charlemagne’s army, was in lock step with Halphen and observed: “As emperor, Charlemagne pursued the political and military course he had been following before 25 December 800.”3

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