Transboundary Pollution, Tax Competition, and the Efficiency of Uncoordinated Environmental Regulation

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atsushi Yamagishi
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Tax Competition ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Pollution Tax

Optimal Environmental Regulation in the Presence of Other Taxes: The Role of Non-separable Preferences and Technology

2002 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Seung-Rae Kim
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Optimal Level ◽  
Environmental Taxes ◽  
Intermediate Input ◽  
Pollution Tax ◽  
Elasticity Of Demand ◽  
Separable Preferences ◽  
Tax Distortions ◽  
The Difference

Abstract Recent studies find that environmental taxes typically exacerbate pre-existing tax distortions and, therefore, the optimal pollution tax should lie below the Pigouvian level (social marginal damages). This paper analyzes a general equilibrium model with non-separable preferences and technology, relatively rare assumptions in this literature, and finds that the second-best optimal pollution tax can be above or below the first-best Pigouvian level. Surprisingly, the ordering of the two does not depend on the degree of pre-existing tax distortion. Moreover, it depends not just on the difference between the two goods' cross-price elasticities with leisure, but on that difference compared to the elasticity of demand for the polluting intermediate input. Finally, the paper shows that under plausible parameter conditions, a greater pre-existing tax distortion can increase the optimal level of environmental regulation.

scholarly journals Why Is Pollution from US Manufacturing Declining? The Roles of Environmental Regulation, Productivity, and Trade

2018 ◽  
Vol 108 (12) ◽  
pp. 3814-3854 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph S. Shapiro ◽  
Reed Walker
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Quantitative Model ◽  
Pollution Tax ◽  
Emissions Reductions ◽  
Economic Forces ◽  
Trade Account ◽  
Emissions Intensity ◽  
Pollution Emissions ◽  
Air Pollution Emissions ◽  
Composition Of Products

Between 1990 and 2008, air pollution emissions from US manufacturing fell by 60 percent despite a substantial increase in manufacturing output. We show that these emissions reductions are primarily driven by within-product changes in emissions intensity rather than changes in output or in the composition of products produced. We then develop and estimate a quantitative model linking trade with the environment to better understand the economic forces driving these changes. Our estimates suggest that the implicit pollution tax that manufacturers face doubled between 1990 and 2008. These changes in environmental regulation, rather than changes in productivity and trade, account for most of the emissions reductions. (JEL F18, H23, L60, Q52, Q53, Q56, Q58)

scholarly journals Incentives for Green and Low-Carbon Technological Innovation of Enterprises Under Environmental Regulation: From the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Chen ◽  
Xin Bai ◽  
Bi Chen ◽  
Jingjing Wang
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Technological Innovation ◽  
Technology Innovation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Pollution Tax ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Government ◽  
Innovation Incentive

Encouraging enterprises to adopt green and low-carbon technological innovation is an important measure to cope with climate change and achieve low-carbon economic development. As the main stakeholders of green and low-carbon technological innovation of enterprises, what measures should the government and the public take to encourage green and low-carbon technological innovation of enterprises has become one of the focuses of research. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government, the public, and enterprises and then obtains the evolutionary stability strategy by analyzing the replication dynamic equation of each subject. Numerical simulation is made on the evolution path of the game under different enforcement intensities of environmental regulation means. The result shows that pollution tax, low-carbon technology innovation subsidy, and environmental protection publicity and guidance are three environmental regulation means to effectively stimulate enterprises’ green and low-carbon technology innovation. And moderate pollution tax, low-intensity publicity of public environmental protection, and high innovation incentive compensation have the highest incentive efficiency for enterprises’ green and low-carbon technological innovation. Targeted suggestions for promoting green and low-carbon technological innovation of enterprises are put forward in the end.

scholarly journals Carbon leakage: the role of sequential policy setting

2011 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 91-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shiva Sikdar ◽  
Harvey E. Lapan
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Interaction ◽  
Carbon Leakage ◽  
Transboundary Pollution ◽  
Environmental Taxes ◽  
Small Open Economies ◽  
Pollution Tax ◽  
Simultaneous Moves ◽  
Simultaneous Move ◽  
Policy Setting

AbstractWe analyze non-cooperative environmental policy when the only strategic interaction between countries is through bilateral transboundary pollution, i.e., countries are closed or small open economies. Under simultaneous moves, there is no carbon leakage. However, in the sequential-move game, carbon leakage occurs; the leader sets its pollution tax lower than that in the simultaneous-move game and lower than the marginal damage from own pollution, while the follower sets its tax higher than that in the simultaneous-move game. The only motive behind the leader's underregulation of own pollution is to reduce the incidence of transboundary pollution from the follower. If pollution is a pure global public bad, aggregate pollution is higher in the sequential-move game than in the simultaneous-move game. The leader (follower) obtains higher (lower) welfare than that under simultaneous moves. Hence, if countries can choose to be leaders or followers, they choose to move first to set environmental taxes.

Economic models of Environment monitoring under imperfect information and high Costs

2014 ◽  
pp. 99-122
Author(s):  
M. Levin ◽  
K. Matrosova
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Monitoring ◽  
Environmental Regulation ◽  
Environmental Economics ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Central Element ◽  
Economic Models ◽  
Environment Monitoring ◽  
Nature Protection ◽  
Protection Measures ◽  
Effective System

The paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principalagent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.

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