Essays on Risk and Uncertainty: Comparing J. M. Keynes and the Von Mises Brothers, Richard and Ludwig, on Probability and Decision Theory

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Emmett Brady
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty ◽  
Von Mises

Deontological Decision Theory and the Grounds of Subjective Permissibility

2019 ◽  
pp. 204-222
Author(s):  
Seth Lazar
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Imperfect Information ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty

If we had perfect information, then we could say, for any given objectively permissible act, what makes it objectively permissible. But when we have imperfect information, when we must decide under risk and uncertainty, what then makes an act subjectively permissible or impermissible? There are two salient possibilities. The first is the “verdicts” approach. It grounds judgments of subjective permissibility in probabilistically discounted judgments of objective permissibility. The principle “minimize expected objective wrongness” takes this approach. The second is the “reasons” approach. It grounds subjective permissibility in probabilistically discounted objective reasons. “Maximize expected utility” is one example. Chapter 10 considers whether the verdicts approach or the reasons approach to grounding judgments of subjective permissibility is better suited for deontological decision-making with imperfect information. Perhaps surprisingly, the reasons approach comes out on top.

Actions, Preferences, and Risk

2020 ◽  
pp. 205-230
Author(s):  
Sergio Tenenbaum
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Instrumental Rationality ◽  
Allais Paradox ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty ◽  
Extended Theory ◽  
Satisfactory Account ◽  
Formal Theories

Formal theories of instrumental rationality, such as orthodox decision theory, often provide a powerful account of the rationality of choice under risk. Can the extended theory of instrumental rationality (ETR) be similarly extended to contexts of risk and uncertainty? Chapter 9 argues that ETR can provide a satisfactory account of rationality in these contexts and that it can actually co-opt the resources of decision theory exactly in the cases in which the theory seems most plausible; namely, the pursuit of what I call “general means” (such as the pursuit of health or wealth). Moreover ETR plausibly renders coherent certain ubiquitous choice dispositions (such as the ones manifested in the Allais paradox) that seem incompatible with orthodox decision theory.

Book Reviews

2010 ◽  
Vol 48 (1) ◽  
pp. 153-156 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Revealed Preference ◽  
Bayesian Decision Theory ◽  
Professor Emeritus ◽  
University Of Michigan ◽  
Bayesian Decision ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty ◽  
Classical Probability ◽  
University College London

Tilman Borgers of University of Michigan reviews “Rational Decisions” by Ken Binmore,. The EconLit Abstract of the reviewed work begins “Explores standard theories of choice and belief under risk and uncertainty, focusing on Bayesian decision theory. Discusses revealed preference; game theory; risk; utilitarianism; classical probability; frequency; Bayesian decision theory; epistemology; large worlds; and mathematical notes. Binmore is Professor Emeritus of Economics at University College London. Index.”

Representation, abstraction, and simple-minded sophisticates

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Dayan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Bayesian Decision Theory ◽  
Bayesian Decision ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Model Free

Abstract Bayesian decision theory provides a simple formal elucidation of some of the ways that representation and representational abstraction are involved with, and exploit, both prediction and its rather distant cousin, predictive coding. Both model-free and model-based methods are involved.

Rational Uses of Decision Theory

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (42) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gordon Pitz
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory

The Measurement of Performance in Probabilistic Diagnosis IV. Utility Considerations in Therapeutics and Prognostics

1981 ◽  
Vol 20 (02) ◽  
pp. 80-96 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. D. F. Habbema ◽  
J. Hilden
Keyword(s):  
Decision Theory ◽  
Figure Of Merit ◽  
Acute Abdominal Pain ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Expected Loss ◽  
Patient Benefit ◽  
Evaluation Approach ◽  
Average Loss ◽  
Actual Decision ◽  
Probabilistic Diagnosis

It is argued that it is preferable to evaluate probabilistic diagnosis systems in terms of utility (patient benefit) or loss (negative benefit). We have adopted the provisional strategy of scoring performance as if the system were the actual decision-maker (not just an aid to him) and argue that a rational figure of merit is given by the average loss which patients would incur by having the system decide on treatment, the treatment being selected according to the minimum expected loss principle of decision theory.A similar approach is taken to the problem of evaluating probabilistic prognoses, but the fundamental differences between treatment selection skill and prognostic skill and their implications for the assessment of such skills are stressed. The necessary elements of decision theory are explained by means of simple examples mainly taken from the acute abdomen, and the proposed evaluation tools are applied to Acute Abdominal Pain data analysed in our previous papers by other (not decision-theoretic) means. The main difficulty of the decision theory approach, viz. that of obtaining good medical utility values upon which the analysis can be based, receives due attention, and the evaluation approach is extended to cover more realistic situations in which utility or loss values vary from patient to patient.

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